

SEC
N.B.
UPG

Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.

(Sgd.) **MP**

Date **23/11/16**

YEAR
STAMP

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.
or POST

MIDDLE EAST

W
418

FILE No. **R 3/324/1 (Part B)**

TITLE: **POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN
IRAN AND IRAQ**

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
Registry		19/3	Bu 24/7		29/7	R		17/XII
GSB	50	21/3	Mr Clark	65	31/7	GSB	100/101	18/XI
R		3/5	Mr Wright	65		R		18/XII
GSB	55	3/5	R.		7/8	PKW	100	28/XI
R			PKW	689	7/8		102	
Mr Harris	54	14/5	R.		13/8		103	
Mr Williams		28/5	GSB	70	13/8	R	104	
Registry					20/8		105	
GSB	58-60		GSB	71/72	20/8	PKW	106	
Reg		29/8	R		20/8	Mr Williams	107-110	19/XI
GSB	61		PKW	75	20/8	GSB	112/113	19/12
Reg		7/6	R		7/X	Mr Williams		
TC	62	7/6	GSB	94	7/X	R	116/117	31/XI
R		10/6	R		31/X			8/1/75
GSB	62	11/6	GSB	95/96	31/X		118	8/1
R		17/6	R		20/XI		120	10/1
PKW	63	17/6	GSB	98	21/4	Registry Address		
R		22/7	R		12/XII	W.92		
PKW	65	22/7	GSB	99	12/12	Downing Street (W)		

FCO 8/2315

**CLOSED
UNTIL
2005**

SEC
N.B.
UPG

(N.B. The grading of papers must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when necessary.)

YEAR STAMP

10/11



United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

UNCLASSIFIED - BY IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL BAG

T J Clark Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO


Your reference

Our reference

Date

3/16/41

18 March 1974



Dear Terry,

Mr. Wright
Mr. Withing
Mr. Burdett
19/3

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ

1. Please refer to my letter 3/16/40 of 13 March. *19/3*
2. The UN Spokesman announced today the appointment of Luis Wickmann-Munoz as Special Representative. The Spokesman added that both parties had agreed to the appointment and that Wickmann would be coming to New York for briefing at the beginning of next week. *pa*

Yours ever,

Michael.

M C S WESTON

Copied to: Chanceries: TEHRAN,
WASHINGTON,
BAGHDAD.

P.S. Shibib has just telephoned to say that he is flying to London on Wednesday night (20 March) and will be staying for 2-3 days.

SECRET

Reference

H of C
Mr Browne
Mr Harney
C
HE

IRAN/IRAQ

1. A person whom I have known for some years, who is well placed (he himself was involved in the negotiation with Iraq) and whom I believe was speaking the truth, gave me the following account of Iran/Iraq relations. His position is delicate, and I should be grateful if in all correspondence reference could be made for the need to protect the source.

2. Negotiations on the basic elements of the Iran/Iraq conflict made some progress in the January of 1973. Iraq recognised that they had little hope of success without Iranian goodwill. Iran insisted that no progress could be made until Iraq accepted a revision of the 1973 Shatt al Arab Treaty. Iraq pleaded that whereas Iran had a long coast, Iraq had but one means of access to the sea: could not Iran, now so powerful, afford to be magnanimous? This was the sticking point, and the negotiations foundered on the Shah's "haughty pride". Revision of the Shatt Treaty had become a point of honour with the Shah, and border unrest had been used as a lever. All the fighting this year had been provoked by the Iranians with the object of applying pressure on Iraq.

3. My informant had nothing but good to say of the Shah's reforms and the progress the country had made. But the Shah was becoming increasingly wilful. He would not be crossed - his pride was becoming overweening.

13 March 1974


D Makinson


CONFIDENTIAL



British Embassy
Tehran

2 pps. (52)
W. Bowyer 13
W. Gask 20/3
19/3

P K Williams Esq
MED
FCO



Your reference

Our reference

3/2

Date

14 March 1974

Dear Peter,

IRAN/IRAQ

1. Our telegram number 125 gave our last report on the most recent border skirmish between Iran and Iraq. When the Ambassador saw Khalatbari on 12 March Khalatbari said that a cease-fire had been agreed and had taken effect from 10.30 am on 7 March. There had been no incidents since. The Iraqi ambassador, Jomah, had returned to Baghdad while this fight was still going on but Khalatbari said there was no question of him having been formally withdrawn. He had been recalled for consultations following the first serious incident. Judging by the local press, relations at the political level have not been unduly disturbed by this latest military incident. Reports claim that Shahidzadeh, Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad, has embarked on the first stage of exploratory talks with the Iraqis to see if a basis exists for further high level talks (paragraph 4 of my minute of 21 February copied to you only).
2. It now seems clear that this skirmish between 4 and 7 March, although resulting in some casualties and damage to equipment on both sides, was on a very small scale compared to the major incident which began on 9 February. Judging from here it was more likely to have been started from a squabble over the exact line of the frontier than by any ulterior political motive which we suspected to have existed in the case of the earlier incident. The head of J2, the Army intelligence and counter-intelligence organization, speaking to us on 7 March, explained how this kind of flare up could occur. Apparently at one time the border had been under Iranian ground forces control and all the frontier posts had been manned. Several years ago, however, the Army was withdrawn and the Gendarmerie given responsibility for guarding the frontier. As they had had neither sufficient men nor resources, a process of abandoning the border posts had begun. Thus over the years the border in many areas had become something of a no-mans land. According to the head of J2, most of the minor disputes in recent years had arisen from Iranian attempts, faced with Iraqi efforts to infiltrate saboteurs and dissidents, to re-assert their control up to the border and to re-occupy all their frontier posts. This had led to endless demarcation disputes. One of the underlying difficulties was that the repeated Iranian request to have the frontier demarked by a line of ground markers had never been responded to by the Iraqis. The head of J2 added that the immediate cause of the major incident on 9 February had been an Iranian civil surveying party which had mistakenly strayed across the frontier. But this did not explain why, on that occasion, the

/Iraqis

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Iraqis had reacted in such strength and numbers.

3. We will no doubt hear of more of these relatively minor clashes. I do not think that they will deflect the Shah from his attempts to find some kind of accommodation with the Iraqis.

Yours sincerely
NW


N W Browne

cc: Chanceries:

UKMIS NY
Washington
Moscow
Kuwait

CONFIDENTIAL

H of C
MINISTER
AMBASSADOR



M. Williams
28/3

IRAN/IRAQ

1. During a conversation with Makki, the Iranian Counsellor, on 23 March, I asked what he thought about Grechko's current visit to Baghdad. After a certain amount of dither, he told me

- i) that the Russians had told the Iranians not to worry about it, and that nothing Grechko was doing would in any way threaten good Soviet/Iranian relations, and
- ii) that in his view the visit should be seen solely in an internal Iraqi context, ie the Kurds. I said that from a recent Soviet press editorial, the Soviet government clearly wanted the Kurds to accept the present autonomy offer; but at the same time it was also probably in their interests as they conceived them, to try and reconcile the parties. But if the Russians thought either that they could or that they should help towards a reconciliation, ✓ Grechko was a curious choice of emissary. Makki agreed; but said that he thought the intention was to enable the Iraqi government to demonstrate to the Kurds the extent of Soviet support of the government's stand, ie an exercise in intimidation.

I record this for what it is worth. Point i) sounds very likely; I am in no position to judge point ii), but Makki's view seems tenable.

R B Bone

25 March 1974

cc: ✓ NED, FCO

CHANCERY, TEHRAN

BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION, BAGHDAD

(54)

RESTRICTED



British Embassy
Tehran

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 17 APR 1974 NBR 3/324/1

Your reference

P K Williams Esq
MED
FCO

Our reference

3/2

Date

10 April 1974

Dear Peter,

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

Mrs. Rothergill.
Please send with copy
of Humaidan's statement
WSB 16/4

1. When the Ambassador paid his first call on the Political Under Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they discussed Iran/Iraq relations, including the Security Council meetings over the border disputes.
2. Tajbakhsh said that the Iranians had been upset by the statement of Humaidan and wondered why he had been given instructions to make such a statement. The Ambassador said that he was sure Humaidan had not received any instructions but had spoken as he did under pressure from the Iraqi representative.
3. The Ambassador would like to see the verbatim record of Humaidan's statement on 20 February. Although we have a reference to it in paragraph 5 of UKMIS New York's memorandum 3/16/36 of 5 March about the SC meetings on Iran/Iraq, we are missing the record for 20 February. I should be grateful if you would send us a copy.

John H J Arbuthnott
for H J Arbuthnott

cc: Chancery New York
Abu Dhabi

Send
P.A. D²³/5

RESTRICTED

55

CONFIDENTIAL



United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
21 MAY 1974
NBR 3/324/1

T J Clark Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO

Your reference
Our reference
Date
3/16/45
9 May 1974

Copy for Mr. Clark
Copy to Research Dept
PUSD
DI 4
Mr. Wright
Mr. Williams
Mr. Burton
Copy UN Dept.
Mr. Martin
10/5
Interesting that this sort of accord
could have been reached so quickly and
without publicity.
(NB for W'ton briefing)
JB
10/5

Dear Tony,

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ

1. As you know, in accordance with the consensus of 28 February (S/11229), the Secretary-General is due to report to the Security Council by the end of this month on the work of his Special Representative, Sr. Luis Weckmann-Munoz. I have not seen anything from Tehran or Baghdad about Weckmann's visit to the area but he is now back here writing his report and the Iranians have invited me to a dinner to meet him next week. When Bayandor telephoned to invite me to the dinner, he said that the report was expected out within the next couple of weeks. The Iranians considered that Weckmann had fulfilled his mandate satisfactorily and they were generally pleased with his efforts, though he seemed to have concluded that Iran was at fault in certain of the cases which had given rise to the Iraqi complaint. However, the most interesting thing was that Weckmann had in fact exceeded his mandate and had engaged in conciliation efforts. This fact was not at the moment being revealed but an agreement had been worked out between the two sides which essentially re-affirmed the earlier boundary on condition that the Iraqis withdrew to Iranian satisfaction. Bayandor did not have full details of the agreement and he did not know whether it would be made public, either in the Secretary-General's Report or separately. He understood, however, that the Iraqis had insisted that the various outstanding issues be considered as a single package and the Iranians had accepted this. Finally, Bayandor said that he hoped that the Council would accept the Secretary-General's report without debate.



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

2. I will report further if there is anything to add after I have met Weckmann next week.

Yours ever,

Michael.

M C S WESTON

Copied to:	Chanceries:	WASHINGTON
		BAGHDAD
		TEHRAN
		PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Harris.

Re see 154 from Tehran about the UAE delegates intervention. A copy of the record is attached.

2. In my reply to Tehran is there anything you would like me to say to put the intervention in perspective.

P. Williams

9/5

Mr Williams.

per

I agree with Mr Parsons: I am sure that Humaidan received no specific instructions to make this statement. The hand of the Saudis may be behind it. Ever since the UAE and Iran exchanged Ambassadors at the start of last year, the UAE has dropped the islands issue. Once or twice the UAE representative at the UN has forgotten

his lines

his lines, ~~and~~ ^{or} other Arab delegates have tried
to stir the issue up again. However ^{(Sheikh Zaid and} the UAE Foreign

Minister have made it clear that they recognise the
advantages of Iman's benevolence. Since the
normalization of relations the stream has been taken
out of the issue, and I do not think either side
will be eager to make a fuss now. My guess
is that it will ~~subside~~ ^{cease} to
be a major issue at least as long as the present
Rulers stay in power on the Arab side of the Gulf.

the King!

Q. H. and

I don't think there is

anything in the above which

Li Parsons will not know.

B.

2.15

pr.

CONFIDENTIAL

56



United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
21 MAY 1974

T J Clark Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

NBR 3/324/1

Date

3/16/46

16 May 1974

Copy for W'con briefs
Mr. Wright
Mr. Williams
Mr. Burton

Mr. Marti. UNP.
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]

Dear Terry,

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ

This looks like a v. satisfactory outcome with both sides acting with unusual goodwill.

Blair
17/5

1. Please refer to my letter 3/16/45 of 9 May.
2. I had a long talk with Ambassador Weckmann last night. He said that the Secretary-General's report was now finished and he would be giving copies to the Iranians and Iraqis on 17 May. It would be distributed as a Security Council document on 20 May. In his concluding observations, the Secretary-General would note that the two parties had now agreed to the following points:
 - (a) the ceasefire should continue;
 - (b) both sides should withdraw their troops from the area of the frontier;
 - (c) both sides should refrain from any provocative action (eg inflammatory radio broadcasts);
 - (d) there should be bilateral negotiations without pre-conditions.
3. Weckmann said that the incidents which had led to the Iraqi complaints seemed to have resulted from the fact that the two sides

/had



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

had different maps of the border area and neither knew precisely where the frontier was. He had detected a wish at the highest level on both sides to cool the situation but he was not a prophet and he could not tell how the bilateral talks would go. No date had yet been fixed for the start of these but he understood that a date would be fixed once the Secretary-General's report had been endorsed by the Security Council. In answer to my question, he said that he foresaw no further role for himself.

4. Weckmann said that both the Iranians and Iraqis agreed that the Council should meet, endorse the report and in particular the four points. The only slight disagreement was whether the endorsement should take the form of a numbered resolution or of an unnumbered consensus. The Iraqis preferred the former and the Iranians the latter. The Iranians were anxious that the meeting should take place before Mauritania assumed the Presidency next month.

5. I subsequently spoke to Hoveyda, who confirmed what Weckmann had told me. He added that he had just seen Shibib and that, although the question of whether the Council should act by resolution or consensus had not been finally settled, Shibib had made clear that he had no wish to see any further controversy and had said that he would only speak in order to thank Weckmann for his efforts. Hoveyda added that his own intention was to do the same.

6. Ismat Kittani, the Iraqi (Kurdish) Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General, later told me that he understood that the Iraqi Government were well satisfied with the outcome. The renewal of the war in Kurdistan meant that they had no wish to tangle with the Iranians as well. When I suggested that the agreement to hold bilateral talks without pre-conditions seemed at first sight to be something of a victory for the Iranians since there was no mention of the existing Treaties, Kittani said that this was true but the Iraqi Government comforted themselves with the thought that there was no reference to the unilateral Iranian abrogation of the 1937 Treaty either.

7. Incidentally, Kittani went on to talk about the war in Kurdistan and said that, while it was difficult to judge from here, he had the impression that the Baathists were succeeding in driving the "rebels" back to unimportant mountain areas. If they succeeded, they would presumably try once more to confine them to the areas until Barzani died. Personally, he saw no possibility of a real settlement until after Barzani's death.

Lawrence,

Michael.

M C S WESTON

Copied to:

Chanceries:

WASHINGTON

BAGHDAD

TEHRAN

PARIS


CONFIDENTIAL

Seems
too good
to be true



United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

T J Clark Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO



Your reference

Our reference

3/16/47

Date

20 May 1974

Dear Tony,

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ

1. Please refer to my letter 3/16/46 of 16 May.
2. There has been a slight delay in the appearance of the Secretary-General's report, but it is still expected out shortly, possibly tomorrow. The problem seems to have been whether to include in the report the full text of the Iran/Iraq agreement. According to the Iranians, the Secretariat originally had doubts about doing so, on the grounds that the Secretary-General might be criticised by the Russians for going further than he was authorised to do by the Security Council, but they eventually decided to include it. *Mr. Williams V. The report did appear 15/5 on 21 May. Copy to Martin UN Dept. then p.m.*
3. The Iranians have told me that they have now agreed that there should be a numbered resolution rather than an un-numbered consensus, though they still hope that it will be adopted unanimously and without debate. They claim that Shibib is being difficult and adopting a harder position than his instructions would demand but they hope that the remaining problems will be sorted out within the next few days, so that the Council can meet before the end of the month.
4. I will, of course, send you the Secretary-General's report as soon as it is available.

Yours ever,

Michael.

M C S WESTON

Copied to:

Chanceries:

WASHINGTON
BAGHDAD

TEHRAN
PARIS



United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

T J Clark Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO

REGISTERED

23 MAY 1974

NBR 3/324/1

Your reference

Our reference

3/16/48

Date

21 May 1974

*Mr. Martin UN Dept to see
Mr. Witterton I entirely agree
I see no reason why
we sh'd object, if, as it seems,
the 2 parties are content.*

Dear Tony,

SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ

1. Please refer to my letter 3/16/47 of 20 May.
2. I enclose the text of the draft resolution which has been agreed between the Iranians and Iraqis. This was given to me by the Iranian Mission. The Iraqis have confirmed that the text is acceptable to them.
3. It is the intention that the Council should meet to adopt the draft resolution on 28 May (27 May is a public holiday and the Council is due to meet on UNFICYP on 29 May). It is still the intention that there should be no speakers other than the two parties, who would confine their remarks to thanking the Secretary-General and Weckmann for their efforts.
4. There are likely to be consultations later this week. Unless we hear from you to the contrary, we shall assume that you see no objection to our supporting the draft resolution.

Yours ever,

Michael.

ENC

M C S WESTON

Copied to:

Chanceries:

WASHINGTON

TEHRAN

BAGHDAD

PARIS

59

h 124
h 124

~~WONFO 055/23~~

OP COPY

NO DISTRIBUTION

~~NYWON 004/23~~

00 FCO

~~GR 50~~

IMMEDIATE

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
28 MAY 1974
NBR 3/324/11

EN CLAIR

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 231550Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 627 OF 23/5/74

WESTON'S LETTER 3/16/47 OF 20 MAY TO CLARK : SECURITY COUNCIL :
IRAN/IRAQ

1. THE CONSULTATIONS HAVE BEEN FIXED FOR 10.30 LOCAL TIME
TOMORROW MORNING (241430Z).

RICHARD

~~NNNN~~

SENT AT 16037/23 RM

GR 275

RESTRICTED

60

CYPHER/CAT A

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 242305Z

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO 35 28 MAY 1974
NBR 3/324/1

COPY

RESTRICTED.

74

TO ROUTINE F C O TELNO 640 OF 24 MAY/INFO TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS.

MY TELNO 627 : SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. AT THIS MORNING'S CONSULTATIONS, THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT THAT COUNCIL SHOULD MEET ON THE MORNING OF 28 MAY AND ADOPT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AGREED BETWEEN THE IRANIANS AND THE IRAQIS (TEXT ENCLOSED WITH WESTON'S LETTER 3/16/48 OF 21 MAY TO CLARK). MALIK (USSR), HOWEVER, PROPOSED THAT THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE SHOULD BE ADDED TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4:
QUOTE THE NATURE AND THE SIZE OF SUCH ASSISTANCE WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS (PROPOSAL) OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. UNQUOTE
2. ZAHAWIE (IRAQ) SAID THE ADDITIONAL SENTENCE WAS ACCEPTABLE TO HIM BUT WE AND THE AMERICANS, SUPPORTED BY THE AUSTRALIANS AND AUSTRIANS, OBJECTED TO MALIK'S AMENDMENT AND ARGUED IN FAVOUR OF RETAINING THE TEXT WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED BY THE PARTIES. ALTHOUGH HE RECEIVED NO SUPPORT, MALIK REFUSED TO WITHDRAW HIS PROPOSAL AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TABLE IT FORMALLY IN THE COUNCIL IF NECESSARY.
3. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT (NOT) FIX THE MEETING FOR THE MORNING OF 28 MAY BUT SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, INCLUDING THE IRAQIS, EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE COUNCIL TO MEET ON THAT DAY AND THIS EVENING THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO CALL THE MEETING FOR THE AFTERNOON OF 28 MAY.
4. FOLLOWING THE CONSULTATIONS, WE SPOKE TO THE IRANIANS, WHO CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET AMENDMENT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM. HOVEYDA SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN DIFFICULT ENOUGH TO PERSUADE TEHRAN TO AGREE TO THE INCLUSION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 AS IT STOOD.

/5. IT REMAINS

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

5. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER MALIK WILL WITHDRAW HIS PROPOSAL AND ACCEPT THE DRAFT AS IT STANDS. AT THE MOMENT, IT LOOKS AS IF HE WILL BUT HE MAY TRY TO SAVE FACE AND PROPOSE A COMPROMISE AND SUGGEST A MINOR AMENDMENT WHICH BOTH WE AND THE AMERICANS AND THE IRANIANS WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT.

RICHARD

FILES

MED

UND

N AM D

WED

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

GRS 120

EN CLAIR

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 282305Z

UNCLASSIFIED


TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 643 OF 28 MAY, INFO TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

MY TELEGRAM NO: 640: SECURITY COUNCIL: IRAN/IRAQ

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY ADOPTED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BY 14 - 0 - 0, WITH CHINA NOT PARTICIPATING, AS RESOLUTION 348.
2. MALIK (USSR) DROPPED HIS PROPOSAL TO AMEND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 BUT IN THE COURSE OF HIS STATEMENT SAID THAT HE HAD DONE SO "ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IF THE PARTIES SHOULD REQUEST ASSISTANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HE WILL OF COURSE AGREE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SUCH ASSISTANCE". IN MY OWN BRIEF INTERVENTION, I SAID THAT NOTHING THAT HAD BEEN SAID UNILATERALLY BY MALIK HAD "IN ANY WAY ALTERED THE RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL" AND THAT "NO DOUBT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD WISH TO CONFER WITH AND CONSULT THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS HE THOUGHT FIT".

RICHARD

FILES
MED
UND
N AND
WED
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR.



61

Top Copy

WBR/s
/a

CONFIDENTIAL



British Embassy
Tehran

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35	
Your reference	-7 JUN 1974
Our reference	
Date	NBR 3/324/1

P K Williams Esq
MED
FCO

30 May 1974

*Enter Don't
Mr Clark to see
NBR 5/2
pa*

Dear Peter,

IRAN/IRAQ

61

1. According to the press, a Foreign Ministry spokesman commented last night on the Iran/Iraq Security Council Resolution adopted on 28 May (UKMIS NY telegram number 643). The spokesman said that the bilateral negotiations referred to in Munoz's report would have to take place without participation by outsiders. He reiterated that Iran was prepared to begin these talks at any level with no preconditions. The spokesman entered the reservation that Iran regretted that Iraq had not been openly named in the report as the aggressor in the recent border clashes. According to today's press Hoveyda made a similar point in New York.

2. When I saw Izadi, head of the Gulf Dept in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, earlier yesterday I asked him what his government had thought of the Munoz report. Izadi said that they had been quite satisfied with it and did not appear to attach much importance to the failure to name the Iraqis as aggressors. It looks as if this was no more than a comment for the record and will not foreshadow an obstructive Iranian attitude to the talks. I then asked Izadi how the Iranians envisaged the bilateral negotiations developing. I said that I was surprised that both sides had accepted that there should be no preconditions since I understood that the Iranians had always insisted that the Iraqis should recognize the abnegation of the 1937 Shatt al Arab treaty before talks could begin. Izadi said that the Iranians were looking for a step by step approach to the talks. They hoped to begin with the least controversial issues and initially set aside the Shatt al Arab question altogether. They might start with delineation of the land border, sharing of water resources and an agreement over territorial waters.

3. It remains to be seen whether the Iraqis will find this approach acceptable.

*Yours sincerely
N.W.B.*

N W Browne

cc: Chancery Baghdad
M.C.S. Weston Esq. UKMIS NY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

→ PW(MED) (63)



United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 11 JUN 1974
NBR 3/324/1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

3/16/54

5 June 1974

*McWilliams - to see SA
NBR 3/324/1
PK.*

MEMORANDUM

SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON IRAN/IRAQ : 28 MAY 1974

MEETING NUMBER : 1770

Background

1. At its 1764th meeting on 28 February 1974, the Security Council adopted a consensus requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative to conduct an investigation of the events giving rise to the recent Iran/Iraq border dispute and to report within three months. This meeting and the background to it are described in the Mission's Memorandum of 5 March 1974. The Secretary-General accordingly appointed Ambassador Luis Weckmann-Munoz, of Mexico as his Special Representative on 18 March. Ambassador Weckmann-Munoz visited the area during April and subsequently produced a report (Annex B) which was circulated to the Security Council on 20 May. A meeting of the Council was called for 28 May to approve the report.

Consultations

2. The Iranians at first favoured a consensus of the Council rather than a resolution but eventually gave way. A draft resolution was then agreed by the two parties (Annex A) taking note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General's representative and welcoming the agreement reached through his good offices to observe the ceasefire of 7 March, to reduce tension on the border and create a climate favourable to discussions between the two sides. All should then have been plain sailing, but at an informal consultation meeting a quinze held by the Kenyan President of the Council (Maina) on 24 May, Malik (USSR) suggested that a sentence should be added to operative paragraph 4 "The nature and the size of such assistance will be determined by the Security Council on the recommendations (proposal) of the Secretary-General." Zahawie



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

(Iraq) said that this was acceptable to him but we and the Americans, Australians and Austrians argued in favour of retaining the originally agreed text. It subsequently emerged that the Iranians also were unable to agree to the Soviet amendment. However, in spite of the opposition which he had received and in spite of the fact that no other delegations supported him, Malik refused to withdraw his amendment. The President of the Council therefore suggested that the meeting of the Council should be postponed but was persuaded that it should be held on the afternoon of 28 May.

3. Over the intervening weekend and on 28 May there was some talk of the USSR toning down its proposed amendment to make it acceptable to more members of the Council. However, in the event Malik decided not to press it at all, even in a toned down version, no doubt recognising that he did not have sufficient support.

Meeting of the Council

4. When the Council accordingly met on the afternoon of 28 May the draft resolution went through without difficulty, being approved by 14 - 0 - 0. China did not participate in the vote on account of their opposition to the involvement of the UN in boundary disputes. The debate yielded little controversial discussion though Malik attempted to save face by stating that in voting for the resolution he still understood that this meant that the Secretary-General would agree with the Council on the nature and extent of any assistance to be provided under its paragraph 4. Mr Richard drew attention to this and said that it was unacceptable that one delegation should seek to impose its own interpretation of a resolution by adding a gloss of this kind. Nothing which Malik had said altered the relationship between the Security Council and the Secretary-General with regard to such disputes.

5. At the end of the discussion, Hoveyda (Iran) said that this resolution concluded the Security Council's consideration of the affair. He regarded the four points of agreement in the resolution as a bilateral agreement between Iran and Iraq. He criticised Iraq for its continued propaganda attacks against Iran and regretted that the Council had not drawn attention to the fact that although Iran had been branded an aggressor by Iraq, according to the findings of the Special Representative, Iran could have been the plaintiff. This led to a series of exchanges of rights of reply concerning Iraq's claim that Iran had abrogated the 1937 Treaty and Iran's counter claim that the Treaty had simply lapsed because Iraq had not

/fulfilled

- 2 -



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

fulfilled its provisions, but with both sides at the same time stating that neither had territorial claims against the other. The exchange was finally brought to an end when the President of the Council reminded the two sides that their agreement provided for bilateral talks between them.

Comment

6. This meeting, which hopefully concludes the UN's consideration of this affair, ended satisfactorily for us on at least two counts. First, it ended with a resolution being agreed which was acceptable to both parties so that we were not called upon to choose between them. Second, the USSR's attempt to tie the hands of the Secretary-General by making the form of his assistance subject to the approval of the Security Council completely failed. On this point, however, we were helped less by the support of other members of the Council for the principle involved, than by their desire to avoid upsetting what had been agreed by the two parties, and thereby risk setting in train a course of events which might end in their having to take sides.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'CAB' or similar, located in the bottom right corner of the page.

CONFIDENTIAL



REFERENCES

(A) TELEGRAMS ON THE DEBATE

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAMS TO THE FCO NO.

627	of	23 May
640	of	24 May
643	of	28 May

(B) UN DOCUMENTS

S/11299	Draft resolution
S/11291	Report of the Secretary-General
S/Res.348	Resolution adopted at the 1770th Meeting



DISTRIBUTION

UN Department (6)

Middle East Dept (2)

Tehran
Baghdad
Abu Dhabi
Canberra
Vienna
Peking
Paris
Dakar
Jakarta
Nairobi
San Jose
Lima
Moscow
Washington
Yaounde

Research Dept. (Miss Buxton.) (2)

Press Section (2)

Mr Battiscombe

Registry (6)



UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/348 (1974)
28 May 1974

RESOLUTION 348 (1974)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1770th meeting,
on 28 May 1974

The Security Council,

Recalling its consensus adopted on 28 February 1974 (S/11229),

1. Takes note with appreciation of the Secretary-General's report, which was circulated to the Security Council on 20 May 1974 (S/11291);
2. Welcomes the reported determination on the part of Iran and Iraq to de-escalate the prevailing situation and to improve their relations and, in particular, the fact that both countries have agreed through the Secretary-General's Special Representative, who was acting in the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices, to the following points:
 - (a) A strict observance of the 7 March 1974 cease-fire agreement;
 - (b) Prompt and simultaneous withdrawal of concentrations of armed forces along the entire border, in accordance with an arrangement to be agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two countries;
 - (c) The creation of a favourable atmosphere conducive to achieving the purpose stated in the following paragraph, by refraining totally from any hostile actions against each other;
 - (d) An early resumption, without any preconditions, at the appropriate level and place, of conversations with a view to a comprehensive settlement of all bilateral issues;
3. Expresses the hope that the parties will take as soon as possible the necessary steps to implement the agreement reached;
4. Invites the Secretary-General to lend whatever assistance may be requested by both countries in connexion with the said agreement.



UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/11291
20 May 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONSENSUS ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 28 FEBRUARY 1974
REGARDING THE COMPLAINT BY IRAQ CONCERNING INCIDENTS ON ITS
FRONTIER WITH IRAN

1. At its 1764th meeting, held on 28 February 1974, the Security Council adopted a consensus regarding the complaint by Iraq concerning incidents on its frontier with Iran (S/11229), by paragraph 5 of which it requested me
 - " - to appoint as soon as possible a special representative to conduct an investigation of the events that have given rise to the complaint by Iraq and
 - " - to report within three months."
2. Accordingly, on 18 March 1974, I appointed Ambassador Luis Weckmann-Muñoz of Mexico as my Special Representative to conduct an investigation of the events that had given rise to the complaint by Iraq. Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz arrived at United Nations Headquarters on 25 March.
3. While at United Nations Headquarters, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz had discussions with me concerning his mission. He also consulted with the President of the Security Council and with the Permanent Representatives of Iran and Iraq.
4. Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, accompanied by Mr. F. J. Homann-Herimberg, of the Secretariat, arrived in Baghdad in the evening of 3 April for a first visit of one week. On 10 April, the mission proceeded to Teheran, where it stayed until 17 April. During these visits, thanks to the full co-operation of both Governments, the Special Representative was able to undertake extensive field trips and to acquaint himself with the situation along those areas of the frontier that had been the scene of recent incidents.
5. In order to clarify some aspects of the respective positions of both Governments, the mission held further discussions with government representatives in Baghdad from 18 to 20 April, in Teheran from 20 to 24 April and again in Baghdad on 24 and 25 April.
6. Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz cabled me on 25 April a summary of his main observations and reported to me further on his return to New York on 3 May.

7. On 16 May, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz submitted to me his written report, which is annexed to the present report. He also informed me that the Governments of Iran and Iraq have agreed through the Special Representative, who was acting in the exercise of my good offices, to the following points:

1. A strict observance of the 7 March 1974 cease-fire agreement;
2. Prompt and simultaneous withdrawal of concentrations of armed forces along the entire border, in accordance with an arrangement to be agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two countries;
3. The creation of a favourable atmosphere conducive to achieving the purpose stated in the following paragraph, by refraining totally from any hostile actions against each other;
4. An early resumption, without any preconditions, at the appropriate level and place, of conversations with a view to a comprehensive settlement of all bilateral issues.

8. In submitting this report to the Security Council, I wish to express the hope that the information contained in it will prove useful to the Council in its consideration of this matter.

Annex

REPORT BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS OF 28 FEBRUARY 1974

Introduction

1. On 18 March 1974, the Secretary-General appointed me his Special Representative in accordance with the terms of the consensus adopted by the Security Council on 28 February 1974 regarding the complaint by Iraq concerning incidents on its frontier with Iran.
2. On 25 March 1974, I took up my duties in New York and discussed with the Secretary-General and his colleagues the mission to be undertaken. I was also provided with relevant documentation by the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and was able to acquaint myself with historical and legal documents relevant to the question.
3. During my stay in New York, I had the opportunity to meet with the President of the Security Council and to consult with the Permanent Missions of Iran and Iraq, particularly as regards the timing and practical arrangements for my visits.
4. Accompanied by Mr. F. J. Homann-Herimberg, whom the Secretary-General had designated to assist me, I visited Iraq and Iran several times in the period from 3 to 25 April and returned to New York on 3 May.
5. An account of my mission and the contacts with the Governments of Iraq and Iran in pursuance of the task entrusted to me by the Secretary-General is given in the following sections of this report.
6. I would like to record my appreciation for the co-operation received from both Governments, who arranged for the contacts we required and provided all facilities, particularly transportation, without which we would not have been able to get a comprehensive view of the situation on the spot.

First consultations with the Government of Iraq

7. Having arrived in Baghdad in the evening of 3 April 1974, we started our consultations the following day. In the course of two meetings with the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. S. Taqa, we discussed the terms of the consensus adopted by the Security Council, the need to gather as much additional information as possible and a time schedule for our visits to the frontier. The Under-Secretary, with the aid of a map, briefed us concerning past and recent border incidents. He also provided us with a map identical to the one annexed to the letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council (S/11224), showing what Iraq considered to be Iranian incursions on Iraq's territory. In addition, Mr. Taqa gave us an initial

explanation of his Government's views on the current relations between the two countries, particularly in the light of the unilateral abrogation by Iran of the 1937 Boundary Treaty between Iran and Iraq, a/ stressing that Iraq considered the current situation to represent a threat to peace and security in the area. In that connexion, he pointed out that the sector of the border where the two armies faced each other was only some 130 kilometres in a straight line from Baghdad.

8. Accompanied by officials of the Foreign Ministry, the Director-General of the border police and the commanding military officers of the respective sectors, we visited the Badra sector on 5 April and the Khanaqin sector on 6 April by helicopter. In the course of several landings along the border, we were given Iraq's account of incursions and recent border incidents, which had been the subject of communications to the Security Council. On the basis of maps, we were shown on the ground and from the air Iraq's interpretation of the border line and were able to observe the proximity of the respective military positions, as well as the concentration of armed forces, frequently backed by heavy weaponry.

9. The Government then made arrangements for us to visit the Shatt-al-Arab estuary, and on 7 April we went by ship from Basrah to beyond Abadan. During the trip, we received a detailed briefing on Iraq's legal position regarding the delimitation of the border and navigation on the river. We were informed that in the absence of mutually respected rules navigation was hazardous, a fact that became evident to us from our own observation. From later conversations in Baghdad and Teheran, we learned that the two Governments were equally desirous of negotiating a navigation agreement designed to ensure safe and unhampered navigation in the Shatt-al-Arab.

10. In the course of a meeting on 8 April 1974, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Mr. M. S. Abdul Baqi, explained the importance his Government attached to the respect of treaties and, at the same time, expressed Iraq's keen interest in having correct relations with its neighbours. In that connexion, the Foreign Minister also expressed regret about the need for massive troop concentrations along the border, which were really in nobody's interest. He stressed the importance of an early withdrawal of forces, alluding also to the possibility of a fresh approach to bilateral conversations.

11. On that and the two following days, further consultations took place with Mr. Taqa and his colleagues. For my part, I gave my impressions of the visit to date and sought additional information regarding the delimitation of the land border. Confirmation was received that the boundary delimitation commissions created as a result of the 1913 Turco-Persian Protocol and the 1937 Boundary Treaty between Iraq and Iran had never finished their work in those areas where the recent incidents had taken place. The Under-Secretary, for his part, gave a further account of past and current relations with Iran and briefed us on what he qualified as his Government's initiatives for bilateral contacts over the last three or four years. He also repeated Iraq's readiness to "find a common ground" and informed us about his Government's initiative for the cease-fire that had eventually been agreed upon for the morning of 7 March 1974.

a/ See documents S/9185, S/9205 and S/9323.

12. During those consultations, we agreed that a further exchange of views after our visit to Iran might be considered.

13. Prior to our departure on 10 April, we paid a courtesy call on the Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad.

First consultations with the Government of Iran

14. We arrived in Teheran late on the evening of 10 April.

15. Because the following two days were holidays, we did not start our consultations until 13 April, when we paid a courtesy call in the morning on Mr. A.-A. Khalatbari, the Foreign Minister, and Mr. G. Tajbakhsh, the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs. That was followed by a working session lasting for the rest of the day with Mr. S. Sadrieh, the Director for Political Affairs, and other high officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As in Baghdad, we discussed the terms of the consensus adopted by the Security Council, the need for additional information, as well as a time schedule for our visits to the frontier. We were given a chronicle of events and frontier clashes in the Mehran region during the period from 10 December 1973 to 10 February 1974 and were shown maps of the area. It was explained that in the opinion of Iran, the investigation should be limited to events prior to 10 February, i.e., those leading to Iraq's complaint to the Security Council. Mr. Sadrieh also acquainted us with his Government's position regarding the boundary question, b/ its views regarding the relations between the two countries and its continued attempts during recent years to hold bilateral negotiations. He also informed us that, prior to recent incidents, no army units had been stationed along the borders. My account of Iraq's desire to ease the military situation and to discuss matters bilaterally was received with interest.

16. In the company of officials from the Foreign Ministry, high-ranking military and gendarmerie officers and commanders of the respective sectors, we visited the area of Mehran (corresponding to Badra in Iraq) on 14 April and the area of Qasr-e-Shirin (corresponding to Khanaqin in Iraq) on 15 April. From Teheran to Dezful and from Kermanshah to Teheran we were transported by aircraft, but the visits along the border were made by helicopter. As was the case during our visit in Iraq, we made landings along the border and visited by car and on foot the scene of recent incidents. Again, we observed the proximity of the respective military positions, as well as the concentration of armed forces and the presence of heavy weaponry. On the basis of Iranian maps, we were shown on the ground and from the air Iran's interpretation of the border line.

b/ See documents S/9190, S/9200 and Add.1 and S/9425.

17. On our return to Teheran, we were received on the morning of 16 April by the Prime Minister, Mr. A. A. Hoveyda, with whom we shared some of the major impressions we had gathered to date. I emphasized the potential dangers of the situation currently prevailing in the areas visited and the urgency for measures to defuse it. The Prime Minister said that his Government had exercised restraint in the past and appreciated the importance of an early defusing of the situation, including the resumption of bilateral contacts, which he hoped would permit both countries to concentrate solely on questions of their own development.

18. On that and the following day, further working meetings took place with Mr. Sadrieh and senior Foreign Ministry officials. As in Baghdad, we compared our impressions from the visit and received confirmation that the boundary in the areas of recent incidents had never been formally defined and that there was a de facto boundary which might vary from that shown on maps drawn up by the boundary delimitation commissions. Having by then become familiar with the maps used by Iraq and Iran, I conveyed my observation that each side was using different sets of maps with different border tracings. As the situation seemed to require further discussion with both Governments, it was agreed that we would have a further round of consultations.

19. On 17 April, before proceeding to Baghdad, we paid a courtesy visit to the Ambassador of Iraq in Teheran.

Second round of consultations with the Government of Iraq

20. On 17 April, we returned to Baghdad.

21. The next morning we met with Under-Secretary S. Taqa and his colleagues, to whom I gave a detailed account of our visit to Iran and the impressions we had gathered. Foremost was our observation that because maps with different land border tracings were being used the recent incidents, with perhaps one exception, seemed to have taken place in areas shown as Iraqi territory on the maps used by Iraq and vice versa, a fact which did not appear to be commonly realized by those dealing with the problem at different levels. I explained that we had also found that the border in the areas visited had not been demarcated on the ground and had been told that if frontier pillars had existed they had either been destroyed by natural causes or had been removed. As regards the maps, Mr. Taqa asserted that those currently used by Iraq were based on those drawn up by the 1914 boundary delimitation commission, reiterating, however, that no final delimitation had taken place. I emphasized the urgent need for a relaxation of tensions, including strict observance of the cease-fire and withdrawal of concentrations of armed forces along the border. I also expressed my belief in the importance of an early resumption of bilateral contacts.

22. The same day we were received by the Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Mr. Saddam Hussein, who, after referring to past grievances, indicated nevertheless his Government's keen desire for sound normal relations and an early dialogue based on respect for sovereignty and justice. The

Vice-Chairman stated that inasmuch as Iraq's earlier attempts in that regard might not have been properly understood by Iran, his Government would continue to play its part, because the burden should not be left entirely to the Security Council or the United Nations.

23. Before departing for Teheran, we had a number of consultations with Mr. Taqa aimed primarily at clarifying Iraq's position regarding further proceedings in the light of our observations and received full assurances of his Government's concurrence with all measures aimed at a defusing of the situation.

Second round of consultations with the Government of Iran

24. In the morning of 20 April we returned to Teheran and were received the same day by the Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr. A.-A. Khalatbari, whom I informed of our latest consultations in Baghdad.

25. During the next two days, a number of working meetings took place in the Foreign Ministry aimed primarily at a clarification of Iran's position on the land border line in the areas of recent clashes and of Iraq's understanding concerning measures aimed at a relaxation of tensions.

26. On 23 April, we were received by His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran, in the presence of the Foreign Minister. I gave an account of our visits to both countries, particularly the border areas, and conveyed our preoccupations regarding the potential dangers of the situation as observed by us and the urgent necessity of measures for de-escalation of tensions. The Shah indicated his country's agreement with a continued strict observance of the cease-fire and a simultaneous withdrawal of armed forces along the entire border between the two countries. He also consented to the creation of a favourable atmosphere for an early resumption of bilateral conversations, which should be aimed at a comprehensive settlement of all bilateral issues and should take place without any preconditions.

27. Subsequently, the Foreign Minister asked me to convey the substance of the conversation with the Shahanshah to the Government of Iraq.

Third round of consultations with the Government of Iraq

28. We returned to Baghdad on the evening of 24 April and were immediately received by Under-Secretary Taqa and his colleagues.

29. Mr. Taqa repeated his Government's interest in a general defusing of the situation and generally expressed agreement with an early resumption, without any preconditions, of conversations with a view to a comprehensive settlement of all bilateral issues.

30. We left Baghdad for Beirut on the morning of 25 April.

Findings and conclusions

31. The events which led to the consideration of this matter by the Security Council have been the subject of a number of communications addressed to the Council by the parties. The recent incidents may be traced to the conflicting views of the two Governments concerning the continuing validity of the 1937 Boundary Treaty between Iran and Iraq; on that question the positions of the parties were first expressed by them in communications addressed to the President of the Security Council on 29 April 1969 by Iraq (S/9185) and on 1 May 1969 by Iran (S/9190).
32. According to information supplied to the Security Council by both Governments, incidents have occurred since April 1972 in a geographical sector ranging in Iraq from the area of Khanaqin in the north to the area of Badra in the south; this corresponds in Iran to the area of Qasr-e-Shirin in the north to the area of Mehran in the south. The mission therefore felt that the investigation should extend to that sector. Although Iran was of the opinion that the investigation concerning the most recent of the clashes should be limited to events prior to 10 February 1974 (those occurring in the Mehran area), the date of Iraq's complaint to the Security Council, we were able to visit the entire sector on both sides.
33. In the course of those visits we were shown from the air or from the ground all of the places of incidents which are mentioned in appendix I and indicated in appendix II. The parties gave to us their accounts of the events which were the subject of their respective communications to the Security Council. Though it was obviously impossible to verify the accuracy of the respective versions of specific incidents, we were shown on both sides traces of what must have been rather intensive exchanges of fire, involving the use of a broad range of weapons. That was evidenced by impacts of projectiles on buildings and mortar and rocket craters in the ground, as well as unexploded and fragments of exploded shells. Both sides have indicated to us that they suffered casualties, including fatalities.
34. The situation along the frontiers visited appeared calm. Indeed, the mission was informed that both Governments had agreed to a cease-fire, which entered into effect in the morning of 7 March 1974 and seemed to be respected by and large, although some isolated shooting of a local nature and without casualties was reported to have taken place. Though both parties claimed to have given strict instructions for a complete observance of the cease-fire agreement, the situation in the areas visited nevertheless appeared tense. That seemed to be particularly the case in sectors where considerable concentrations of armed forces, frequently backed by impressive weaponry, were observed and where the distance between the respective forces was minimal (80 to 150 yards).
35. The mission also learned from both Governments that in most of the areas of recent clashes the frontier had never been clearly delimited. Not only did the boundary delimitation commissions created as a result of the 1913 Turco-Persian Constantinople Protocol and the 1937 Boundary Treaty between Iraq and Iran never complete their work but, even where they did, the frontier in the areas of clashes

was never, or was no longer, clearly marked on the ground. We observed that the sector of incidents had few permanent settlers and that its main characteristic was a continuous succession of mountains and, chiefly, hills. Because of the lack of boundary marks it is difficult to say whether the frontier line follows the contour or the crest of a particular hill. There is therefore widespread disagreement on whether particular stretches of land belong to the territory of one or the other of the parties concerned. This is also demonstrated by the fact that maps showing different border lines have been and are being used by Iraq and Iran (see appendix II) apparently without either side being aware of the fact. Except for artillery fire and shelling, most, if not all, of the recent incidents have taken place in these areas of conflicting geographical claims. The only likely exception is the most serious of the incidents, which took place on Hill 343 in the Zaluab Heights on 10 February 1974, in the course of which many human lives were lost. This hill is shown as part of Iran's territory on Iranian maps; though the scale of the map provided by Iraq did not permit us to confirm this fact, the 1914 map does. Generally speaking, however, the 1914 border line tracing of the Khanaqin-Badra/Qasr-e-Shirin-Mehran sector seems to favour Iraq's interpretation, although again not in every respect.

36. In view of these observations, it would seem important to delimit and demarcate the border line. We were assured by both sides that neither, in principle, had territorial claims along the land frontier; both Governments, in fact, indicated that they would stand by the findings of a new joint delimitation commission, which could also settle at the same time the question of the sharing of waters of those rivers that flow from one country to the other. It would appear that this question should be given priority in the conversations on bilateral issues.

37. With regard to another highly important issue, namely, the Shatt-al-Arab question, it appears that, notwithstanding the fact that the respective legal positions of both countries are incompatible at present, there is nevertheless a willingness to negotiate on a practical basis an agreement designed to ensure safe and unhampered navigation on the river. Further points mentioned to us in both capitals that seem to require negotiation are the questions of the extent of territorial waters, fishery zones and the exploitation of the continental shelf.

38. Whatever the problems of the past may have been, there is a clear desire on the part of both Governments on the need to de-escalate the prevailing situation. In this context, the strict observance of the 7 March 1974 cease-fire agreement and a prompt and simultaneous withdrawal of concentrations of armed forces along the entire border, in accordance with an arrangement to be agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two countries, are most important elements. This should be accompanied by appropriate measures for the creation of a favourable atmosphere conducive to bilateral conversations, by refraining totally from any hostile actions against each other. Such conversations, which, according to indications, might be resumed at an early stage and without any preconditions, at the appropriate level and place, would clearly be the best way to settle in a comprehensive way all bilateral issues.

Appendix I

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF INCIDENTS AS REPORTED BY THE PARTIES

1. 10 April 1972. Three Iranian gendarmes attacked and abducted by Iraqi infiltrators while travelling from Naft-e-Shah to Qasr-e-Shirin (Iranian report, see S/10627)
2. 11 April 1972. Iranian forces infiltrating Iraqi territory opened fire on a police vehicle in the Khanaqin area (Iraqi report, see S/10615)
3. 11 April 1972. The Iranian border post of Amineh shelled (Iranian report, see S/10627)
4. 12 April 1972. Exchange of heavy fire in the same area (Iraqi report, see S/10615)
5. 12 April 1972. Iraqi troops shelled the border post of Amineh and attacked the nearby Iranian posts at Tazeh-Gol, Reza-Abad and Heydar-Abad (Iranian report, see S/10627)
6. 13 April 1972. Iraqi troops shelled the Iranian border posts at Amineh and Reza-Abad (Iranian report, see S/10627)
7. 10 December 1973. Troops accompanied Iranian technicians trying to build a road in the area of the Iraqi Al-Jabal police post (Iraqi report, see S/PV.1762)
8. 15 December 1973. Skirmish in Kanisakhat (Iranian report, see S/PV.1762)
9. 24 December 1973. Attempt to build a road in Badra area (Iraqi report, see S/PV.1762)
10. 24 December 1973. Kanisakhat attacked from the Zaluab Heights (Iranian report, see S/PV.1762)
11. 25 December 1973. Kanisakhat bombed from the three hills of the Zaluab (Zaloo-Abe) Heights that dominate Kanjan-Cham Dam and the frontier post of Reza Abad; and four-hour occupation of the three hills of the Zaluab Heights. One Iranian soldier fatally wounded (Iranian report, see S/PV.1762)
12. 26 December 1973. Frontier post attacked from Dorraji in Iraq (Iranian report, see S/PV.1762)
13. 24 January 1974. Iranian forces repulsed from Badra county area (Iraqi report, see S/11216)


14. 30 January 1974. Attack on herdsmen in Kulak (Namme-Kalan) heights (Iranian report, see S/11218)
15. 31 January 1974. Patrol fired at from Heights of Al-Jabal (Iranian report, see S/11218)
16. 4 February 1974. Attack on Iraqi border positions (Iraqi report, see S/11216); same as No. 17
17. 4 February 1974. Iranian armoured units attacked Iraqi border force (in Zaluab Heights) (Iraqi report, see S/PV.1762); same as No. 16
18. 5 February 1974. Shelling in Mehran region and an encounter. One Iranian soldier killed (Iranian report, see S/11218)
19. 10 February 1974. Border clash (Iraqi report, see S/11216); same as No. 21
20. 10 February 1974. Shelling of frontier posts at Zaluab Heights - Kanisakhat, Reza Abad (between Mehran and Ilam), Jazman (2 kilometres south-west from Reza Abad post) and Kanjan-Cham Dam and an incursion repelled. Iraqis left 14 dead behind (the figure was corrected later to 24). Iranians suffered 81 casualties, among them 42 dead (Iranian report, see S/11218); same as No. 22
21. 10 February 1974. Attack against Iraqi border posts at Al-Daraji and Al Sudur (Iraqi report, see S/PV.1762); same as No. 19
22. 10 February 1974. Bloody encounter on Hill 343 in Zaluab and on the Heights of Reza Abad, on Iranian territory (Iranian report, see S/PV.1762); same as No. 20
23. 12 February 1974. Incursion in region of Mehran continues (Iranian report, see S/11218)
24. For some time before 15 February 1974. Iran established guard posts in the following points indicated on the map annexed to S/11224: (1) Al-Behailah (in the Qalat Salih administrative area) 1 kilometre within Iraqi territory;* (2) Al-Jabal, in Badra county 5 kilometres inside Iraqi territory; (3) Al-Ziadi, also in Badra, 5 kilometres within Iraqi territory; (4) Tek Tek, also in Badra, 7 kilometres within Iraqi territory; (5) Khalat-Lan (Kalahan) in the Mandali area, 1 kilometre within Iraqi territory; (6) Nee Khedher, in Mandali, within Iraqi territory (Iraqi report, see S/PV.1762)
25. Between 16 and 20 February 1974. Clashes in Khanaqin area (Iraqi report, see S/11224)

* Some 225 kilometres south of Badra.

26. 22 February 1974. Iraqi post of Hani Baz (Kanibez) opened fire on Iranian post of Amineh (Iranian report, see S/11231)
27. 28 February 1974. Iraqi post of Ghashgah opened fire on Iranian border guards (Iranian report, see S/11231)
28. 2 March 1974. Iraqi armed forces in Mohamad Khezr opened fire on Amineh and Tappeh-Kal (Iranian report, see S/11231)
29. 3 and 4 March 1974. Iraqi border forces under heavy artillery in the region of Zain Alqaws and in the areas surrounding the border post of Muhammed Khedher (Iraqi report, see S/11233)
30. 4 March 1974. Fire lasting several hours opened on Iranian border posts of Zeynal Kosh, Amineh, Reza Abad and Tangabkohne in the area of Khan Leili of Ghasre Shirin (Iranian report, see S/11230)
31. 4 March 1974. Iraqi guards at Ghaleh-Yahoudi shelled Zaynalkosh and Tangab Khohneh, as well as the Khan Leili route and the bridge on the river Tangab Khohneh (Iranian report, see S/11231)
32. 4 March 1974. Iraqi armed elements stationed at Manzarieh shelled Iranian positions and the Iranian border posts of Tangab Khoneh, Amineh and Tap-peh-kal were kept under fire (Iranian report, see S/11231)
33. 5 March 1974. Shelling resumed in area of Khan Leili (Iranian report, see S/11230)
34. 6 March 1974. Armed attack against same areas of Zain Alqaws and Muhammed Khedher (Iraqi report, see S/11233)

Appendix II

MAP SHOWING IRANIAN AND IRAQI VERSIONS OF BOUNDARY LINE
IN THE QASR-E-SHIRIN-MEHRAN/KHANAQIN-BADRA SECTOR



Mandali ○

IRAN

IRAQ

○ Ilam

Khalat-Lan/Kalahan

○ Hilala

Neikhasar/
Nee Khedher
○

33°
30'

33°
30'

----- Version of boundary line by Iran

..... Version of boundary line by Iraq

The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

Kanisakht ○

Al-Jabal ○

○ Kan-Jan-Cham Dam

Al-Sudur ○

Zaluab Heights
"Hill 343"

Al-Daraji ○

Reza-Abad ○

Badra ○

○ Mehran

0 5 10 15 20 mi
0 5 10 15 20 km

33°
00'

45°30'

46°00'

46°30'

33°
00'

CONFIDENTIAL

64



British Embassy
Tehran

Handwritten signature

P K Williams Esq
MED
FCO

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 - 2 JUL 1974 NBR 3/324/1.

Your reference

Our reference 3/2

Date 27 June 1974

Dear Peter,

IRAN/IRAQ

1. When I saw Parvizian, Deputy Head of the responsible Political Department in the MFA, last night, I asked whether anything had been done to prepare for the bilateral talks between Iran and Iraq provided for in the recent Security Council Resolution. I had seen that the Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad, Shahidzadeh, had been back in Tehran.

2. Parvizian said that there had been no progress at all. They had made it clear to the Iraqis, as indeed they had before the United Nations came into the picture, that Iran was prepared to take part in bilateral talks in any place and on any date that the Iraqis cared to nominate. But the Iraqis had done nothing. Parvizian added that if any talks took place, he did not think the atmosphere would be very good. Iraqi airforce planes were constantly violating Iranian air space which the Iranians regarded as being contrary to the cease-fire undertaking that the Iraqis had given to the United Nations. At least there had not been any border skirmishes recently, which was something.

3. I detected no inclination on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to do anything to resolve this impasse. Any progress, will it seems, depend on whether the Iraqis are prepared to suggest some specific arrangements, which I would think most unlikely with the Kurdish situation as it is.

Yours sincerely
N W Browne

N W Browne

cc Chanceries: Baghdad, Kuwait

CONFIDENTIAL



British Embassy
Tehran

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 22 JUL 1974 NBR 3/324/1

P K Williams Esq
Middle East Department
FCO

SECRET

Enter.

65

Para 3: This could well fit in with our general line of approach on Iraq vis à vis the Shah.

Copy: W D Norberry DI 14.6
Mo.D. would be interested to see.

Your reference

Our reference

Date

18 July 1974

22/7

Dear Peter,

IRAN/IRAQ

By 24/7.

Minute. 26/7.

1. During the last week we have seen a revival of anti-Iraqi propaganda in the Tehran press. A so-called "confession" of two alleged Iraqi agents in Abadan, which included accounts of how the saboteurs had become disillusioned with the poverty, hunger, disease and fratricide they had seen in Iraq, has been given considerable publicity. The local newspapers have also started to make the most of reports, including regular ones from an Iranian reporter, of the plight of the Kurds. Since the UN exchanges the Iranian press had for a while been much quieter about Iraq; it looks as if they are now beginning to revert to the old policy of taking regular swipes at their neighbour.

2. A further article in Kayhan International of 14 July, a copy of which I enclose, may partly explain this new approach. It gives some detailed statistics on the Iraqi armed forces. As one might expect these figures considerably exceed estimates we have from other sources. For example, the article claims that the Iraqis have 50 supersonic bombers (TU 22, TU 16 and Ilyushin 28). Ian McCluney gave a figure of 24 in his letter to me of 20 June (of which I also enclose a copy). The latest report on the Military Balance produced by the IISS in September 1973, gives a figure of only 8 supersonic bombers - TU 16s. Again the figures for fighters vary considerably. Kayhan gives 200, including Hunters, Ian McCluney gives 84 and the IISS give 156. (On the other hand the Kayhan figure of 200 tanks is presumably a misprint for 2,000).

3. Even allowing for deliberate exaggeration for propaganda purposes it seems that the Iranians estimate considerably higher than other authorities, including ourselves, the strength of the Iraqi armed forces. The Shah's assessment of Iraq's potential is obviously of crucial importance to him. We would be interested to know what you think to be the most authoritative statistics. The Shah has a habit of believing reports from his own sources, but he also has considerable respect for information provided by us. If you could let us have an authoritative and quotable inventory of the main Iraqi armament which the Ambassador could give to the Shah or Alam, this could be a useful corrective.

/4.

SECRET

SECRET



4. This campaign was at its height just before the Iraqi National Day, celebrated here on 16 July. There was, predictably, a poor Iranian turn-up of whom the most senior were a few middle ranking MFA officials and Army officers.

Yours sincerely
NW

N W Browne

cc:

Chancery, Baghdad
D Norbury Esq, DI4b, MOD

SECRET

The colossal armoured build-up in Iraq

IRAQ has amassed the greatest armoury in the Middle East, political experts revealed last week.

The experts concluded that Iraq had the largest army and air force among the Arab nations, something which is of great concern to other Arab capitals.

The experts conducted an in-depth study of the country's armaments and compiled figures on Baghdad's strike force, which has more arms in proportion to its population than any other country in the area.

Although Iraq has already built a large force, mostly through purchases from the Eastern Bloc, it is still trying to obtain more arms through non-Communist countries.

The Iraqi armoured force, which far surpasses that of its neighbours, has 200 tanks, 2,500 armoured personnel carriers and 3,000 cannons.

Its air force, which is comprised of 660 planes, includes 50 supersonic bombers of the TU-22, TU-16 and Ilyushin-28 type, which are capable of blanketing the whole area with bombs.

The air force also has 125 fighter bombers of the Sukhoi-20 and Sukhoi-7 series and 200 fighter planes which are mostly MIG-21, MIG-19, MIG-17 and MIG-15 type. It also has a number of British Hawker Hunter fighters.

There are 150 helicopters in the Baghdad arsenal. These are MI-4s, 6s and 8s and a number of French Alouettes and British-made craft.

The air force also has 60 military transports of the Antonov-12 and 24 series, the TU-124 and British Bristols and it has 75 planes in stock used for training pilots of the British Provost-type.

The Iraqis also have a num-

ber of anti-aircraft SAM 2, 3, 6 and 7 missile sites already installed.

Although the Iraqi force has always been considered formidable on the ground and in the air not much attention has been paid to its naval fleet. Since only 30 kilometres of Iraqi soil touch on a large body of water it was thought that the Iraqis had not built up a naval force.

But the experts refute this with figures which quote the Iraqi Navy as having 10 missile launching speedboats, four minesweepers, 18 torpedo boats, three anti-submarine cruisers, two torpedo sweepers and 30 coastal patrol boats.

The Iraqi force is also equipped with a large radar network which includes 60 installations around the country.

The Iraqis are also prepared for chemical warfare according to the magazine, which includes an arsenal of various lethal gases.

There are varied reports about the use of the gases, but there is some indication that they have been using the gases in the confrontation with the rebellious Kurds.

The list of arms arms is also very long. The experts were of the opinion that Iraq had far surpassed its needs in its accumulation of arms.

Baghdad's armoury has been the topic of discussion at many meetings among Arab leaders.

The Arabs particularly have requested that the Iraqis put their arms at their disposal in their wars with Israel, but each time the Iraqis have found an excuse and have created artificial conflicts in their own area to give the appearance of needing all the arms.


The Iraqis have tried to soothe their neighbours fears — particularly Kuwait — by engineering conflicts in order to reassure the Arabs that they are in need of the arms for themselves against what the experts termed as "invisible enemies."

The recent conflict with the Kurds is the result of pressure put on the Kurds by Baghdad and has been used to further the policy of "amassing as many arms as possible."

The Iraqis have tried on the one hand to play the Kurdish conflict down as much as possible saying it is only a "minor irritant" while on the other they have used the Kurdish problem as an excuse to create their large armoury.

The experts report that the Iraqis are also trying to use "a threat of Iran" argument to build up their arms even more without alienating their Arab neighbours and to avoid offering aid to the Arab countries in their conflict with Israel.

Similarly, the Iraqis have been trying to disrupt the efforts by the United Nations Security Council to mediate the conflict between Iran and Iraq.



Keyhan 14. 7. 79.



3/5

BRITISH EMBASSY

TAGEHAD

20 June 1970

N W Browne Esq
British Embassy
TEHRAN

For Brown.

18A

1. Thank you for your letter of 11 April and for a copy of the comprehensive interview with the Shah in "Blitz". It is interesting that he values India's links with Iraq so much that the presence of Indians helps to exclude the East. His remarks on Iraq's armed forces are fairly accurate and we believe the Iraqis have

(Shah's figures)

(No figures)

- MIG 17 & 21	60
- SU 7	24
- SU 20	24
- Hunters	24
- IL 28	6
- TU 16	6
- TU 22	12
Helicopters	84
Frog	Yes

(12)

2. He therefore underestimated the SU 20 strength and overestimated the TU 22 strength. However his assessment may be better than ours!

Yours ever

I. McClure

I. McClure

Rec'd today pm
I think this would be useful. letter to issue
Mr Clark ✓
Mr Wright ✓ 31/7 18 5/8

THE SHAH AND IRAQ

1 You should see Mr Browne's interesting letter of 18 July. The point about Iranian conceptions of Iraqi military strength is one that crops up fairly frequently and the enclosed article from Kayhan of 14 June bears signs of having been officially inspired.

2 I can see merit in the suggestion in paragraph 3 of Mr Browne's letter that we might provide an authoritative and "quotable" (presumably by us to the Shah and not for public use) inventory of Iraqi strength which could be used with the Shah. As I see it, to do this might possibly help allay any suspicions he might entertain about a British rapprochement with Iraq and would act as useful background to the approach on Cymbeline and Hawker trainers for Iraq which we will probably be making to him.

3 I have tentatively discussed the idea with the Defence Intelligence Staff who see no great difficulty in providing such material up to Secret level. If you agree, I will now write and ask them formally to do so.

P. K. Williams

P K Williams
Middle East Department

29 July 1974



British Embassy
Tehran

CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
31 JUL 1974
NBR 3/324/1

Rampen
PS 29
copy *his* *Wright*
SEED.

P K Williams Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO

Your reference
Our reference 3/2
Date 25 July 1974

Dear Peter,

IRAN/IRAQ

1. My letter of 23 June painted a gloomy picture of the prospects for talks between the two countries. We now have some more promising news.
2. The Ambassador heard at an EEC briefing on the visit of the Dutch Foreign Minister, that the latter had been told by Khalatbari that there was a possibility that negotiations between Iran and Iraq might be stage managed by Turkey. Turkey was a country with good relations with both sides. The tentative idea was that the negotiations would be without pre-conditions, that is they would agree in advance not to talk about the Shatt-al-Arab. This was envisaged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs back in May (my letter of 30 May) and it looks as if the Iraqis might have agreed.
3. Khalatbari's view was that, if these talks got under way, they should start at official level.

Yours sincerely
NW

N W Browne

cc:
Chanceries, Baghdad,
Kuwait

CONFIDENTIAL

(57)




British Embassy
Tehran

Envar.

Pa. B 5/8

Letter

P K Williams Esq
MED
FCO



Your reference

Our reference 3/2

Date 28 July 1974

Dear Peter,

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. I see from paragraph 40 of the record of the Anglo/French talks on the Middle East held on 27 June, that we will probably have an Ambassador in Baghdad by September. We do not remember seeing a reference to this any where else. Please may we be kept informed?

Yours sincerely
Nick

N W Browne

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

N W Browne Esq
British Embassy
TEHRAN



Your reference

Our reference

Date 6 August 1974

Dear Nick,

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

1 Thank you for your letter (reference 3/2) of 28 July about the reference in the record of the Anglo/French talks on the Middle East to the forthcoming appointment of an Ambassador in Baghdad. You will by now probably have seen the reference in The Times to the announcement that Mr J A N Graham, currently Minister in Washington, has been appointed Ambassador at Baghdad. Now that the appointment has emerged from the secret recesses of POD, I gather that he will probably be taking up his post in late September.

2 We have heard nothing from the Iraqis either here or in Baghdad about the appointment of an Iraqi Ambassador in London. There has been some speculation about possible candidates, but these have now been reassigned to other posts. So for the present at least there are no indications that the Iraqis plan to reciprocate our action in sending an Ambassador to Baghdad.

yours ever,

Peter

pa 7/8
RS

P K Williams
Middle East Department

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 -7 AUG 1974 Our reference NBR 3/324/1 Date 6 August 1974

Lt Col I Mackay
Ministry of Defence (DI4)
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

6 August 1974

Dear Ian,

THE SHAH AND IRAQ

1 We spoke recently about Nick Browne's letter of 18 July.

2 I have consulted here about the suggestion in Browne's letter that we might see whether we could not let the Embassy at Tehran have an authoritative and quotable inventory of the main Iraqi armament which the Ambassador could give to the Shah or Allam. As I told you, I can see some political advantage in our doing this and am sure that the gesture would be appreciated by the Shah. I would be grateful therefore if you could see whether a suitably impressive and up-to-date table could not be prepared for this purpose. When we discussed the question, you said that you thought that it would be necessary for this to be classified up to secret. I assume that the "quotable" in Browne's description refers to use with the Shah and not to any wider dissemination, and that the material would in form be unattributable.

3 In view of further recent references by the Shah to the Iraqi arms build-up (the most recent was on 29 July, when he told some visiting oil company executives that he was concerned about the build-up in Russian aggressive weapons to Iraq and Syria) I would, if it were at all possible, like to provide the Embassy with the material in the next week or so.

yours ever,

Peter

*Pa.
P.D. 7/8*

P K Williams
Middle East Department

SECRET

CLAIR

FM TEHRAN 120715Z AUG

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

13 AUG 1974

NBR 3/324/1

TOP COPY

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 424 OF 12 AUG/⁷⁴RPTD FOR INFO TO
BAGHDAD AND ISTANBUL RPTD SAVING TO KUWAIT, WASHINGTON,
MOSCOW, ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK AND JEDDA.

66
BROWNE'S LETTER OF 25 JULY (NOT TO ALL) : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. LOCAL PAPERS, QUOTING AGENCY REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD AND INFORMED SOURCES IN TEHRAN, HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT PRELIMINARY TALKS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ WILL BEGIN IN ISTANBUL TODAY AT OFFICIAL LEVEL. ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS, THE IRANIAN DELEGATION WILL BE LED BY SADRIEH DIRECTOR GENERAL, ASIA AND AFRICA, MFA, AND THE IRAQI DELEGATION BY HIS COUNTERPART, TALEB CHEBID.

2. THE OBJECT OF THE TALKS IS SAID TO BE THE PREPARATION OF AN AGENDA FOR A LATER SESSION AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL.

FCO PSE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

PARSONS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

MED

NENAD

N AM D

SEED

UND

PS

PS/MR ENNALS

SIR O WRIGHT

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

*Wsh 12/18
pa*

0931

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
19 AUG 1974
NBR 3/324/1

MOD DIS : BUTION

FCO 842/E47/15

LLC NR 529/15
PP MODUK
GRS 100

CYPHER CAT A
FM TEHRAN 150447Z
CONFIDENTIAL

MEJ
Mr. Burt
Mr. Williams 16/8

15/8

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO FOH 960 150447Z AUG.
FOR DIA FROM DA. IRANIAN PAPERS TODAY BEAR NEWS OF RESUMED
EXCHANGE OF ARTILLERY FIRE IN QASR-E-SHIRIN AREA SINCE
4 AUG 74. US MILITARY ATTACHED INFORMED ME THIS HAS BEEN
CONFIRMED TO HIS AMBASSADOR BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
IRANIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOURCES HAVE DECLINED TO
CONFIRM OR DENY IT IN THE USUAL MANNER.

2. COMMENT. IT SEEMS STRANGE COINCIDENCE THAT SHELLING
WAS RESUMED IN THIS AREA AT TIME NEW IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO
IRAN WAS PRESENTING HIS CREDENTIALS AND IS NOW RESUMED
AGAIN AT TIME OF ISTANBUL NEGOTIATIONS.

PARSONS

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
19 AUG 1974

NBR 3/324/1

MOD DIV : 20110N

FCO 842/E47/15

LLC NR 529/15
PP MODUK
GRS 100

CYPHER CAT A
FM TEHRAN 150447Z
CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO FOH 960 150447Z AUG.
FOR DIA FROM DA. IRANIAN PAPERS TODAY BEAR NEWS OF RESUMED
EXCHANGE OF ARTILLERY FIRE IN QASR-E-SHIRIN AREA SINCE
4 AUG 74. US MILITARY ATTACHED INFORMED ME THIS HAS BEEN
CONFIRMED TO HIS AMBASSADOR BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
IRANIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOURCES HAVE DECLINED TO
CONFIRM OR DENY IT IN THE USUAL MANNER.

2. COMMENT. IT SEEMS STRANGE COINCIDENCE THAT SHELLING
WAS RESUMED IN THIS AREA AT TIME NEW IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO
IRAN WAS PRESENTING HIS CREDENTIALS AND IS NOW RESUMED
AGAIN AT TIME OF ISTANBUL NEGOTIATIONS.

PARSONS
BT

NNNN

FCO 874/E83/15

LLC NR 544/15

PP MODUK

RR BAGHDAD

GRS 120

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 150803Z

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
19 AUG 1974

NBR 3/324/1

MOD DISTRIBUTION

HET

Mr. Williams
Mr. Rutherford
Rand pa. J. 13/8
B. 16/8

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO FOH 966 150803Z AUG.
INFO BAGHDAD.

FOR DIA FROM DA. IRAN/IRAQI BORDER CLASHES. FURTHER TO MY
FOH 960 OF 150447Z AUG NOT TO BAGHDAD.


1. ECHO OF IRAN PUTS FORWARD A VIEW THAT BORDER CLASH MAY BE INSTIGATED BY FACTION WITHIN BAATHIST REGIME OPPOSED TO IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
2. WE INCLINE TO BELIEVE TIMING OF THIS MINOR DISPUTE IS TOO COINCIDENTAL FOR IT TO BE AN ACCIDENT BUT WE WOULD NOT HAZARD A GUESS AS TO WHICH SIDE STARTED IT. EITHER SIDE ARE QUITE CAPABLE OF ENGINEERING IT TO RUB HOME THE ISTANBUL TALKS.
3. KAYHAN HOWEVER CARRIES BRIEF ARTICLE QUOTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS SAYING ISTANBUL TALKS LIKELY TO LEAD TO SETTLEMENT OF BORDER DISPUTES.

PARSONS

BT

[Sent 5 1100]

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/11329
8 July 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH



73
M. Williams 10/7
M. Butler 10/7
J. 10/7

LETTER DATED 5 JULY 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL

Upon instruction from my Government and with reference to the letter addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations dated 25 June 1974 (S/11325), I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Iraq wishes to state that it shall not comment on the Iranian interpretations of the consensus adopted by the Security Council on 28 February 1974 and of resolution 348 (1974). The decisions of the Council are clear and unambiguous and Iraq has stated its position thereof on several occasions. What is important, as far as the Government of Iraq is concerned, is that all efforts should be directed towards the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Council. Iraq is ready to exert its efforts to implement that resolution.

The Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations, and indeed the international community as a whole, are well aware of which party is responsible for the present state of affairs existing between Iraq and Iran. The Government of Iraq does not wish to enter into new arguments which would not be in the interest of the implementation of the decisions and the agreements which Iraq is determined to fulfil.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Karim AL-SHAikhLY
Permanent Representative of
Iraq to the United Nations

SECRET

From: Captain D M Norbury R Anglian



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

Telephone ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

01-218

(74)

P K Williams Esq
Middle East Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Your reference

Our reference DI4/IN 307/5

Date 12 August 1974

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
15 AUG 1974

NBR 3/324/1

John Peter.

THE SHAH AND IRAQ

(69)

1. In answer to your letter dated 6 August 1974, which I have *attached* received in Colonel Ian's absence, I enclose our assessment of the present Iraqi Armed Forces order of battle and main equipment holdings.

2. I have not covered the subject of effectiveness of the forces involved because ultimately that is closely linked to the enemy which they are likely to confront. The Shah will have been able to assess this for himself by looking closely at the border letters at the beginning of the year and receiving Kurdish reports on Iraqi activities in Kurdistan. He will also be aware of the bloody nose received by the Iraqis in the October 73 hostilities.

3. A final word about who and what the Shah believes. I believe it is worth the Shah having a ready enemy, against whom he is able to launch a considered campaign and thereby have a good reason to explain his activities in the defence field to his opponents. In sum, under some circumstances I believe the Shah may wish to believe his own propaganda and this just may affect his reaction to our assessment.

Yours sincerely

John Peter.

*Letter to Tehran
Rand pa
15/8*

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX A
TO DI4/IN 307/5
DATED 12. August 1974

GROUND FORCE ORBAT

- | | <u>Location</u> |
|---|-----------------|
| 1. <u>MOD Units</u> | |
| a. Republican Guards Bde | Baghdad |
| b. 17 Special Forces Bde (Cdo and Para) | Kirkuk |
| <p><u>Note.</u> SF now expanded to 6 Bns, majority now deployed to Kurdistan. Unit may soon be designated as a Division.</p> | |
| 2. <u>1(Northern) Army Area</u> | |
| a. 2 Mountain Div | Kirkuk |
| b. 4 Mountain Div | Mosul |
| c. 8 Infantry Div | Irbil |
| <p><u>Note.</u> Formed early 1974.</p> | |
| d. 9 Infantry Div | Sulama |
| <p><u>Note.</u> Formed mid 1974. This formation may not necessarily come under control of this Northern area command. Both these new divisions are probably under strength and significant numbers of troops joining them are reservists.</p> | |
| 3. <u>2(Central) Army Area</u> | |
| a. 10 Armoured Div | Baghdad |
| b. 3 Armoured Div | Tikrib |
| c. 6 Armoured Div | Baquba |
| <p><u>Note.</u> Elements of 3 and 6 Armd Divs have been involved in Kurdistan operations.</p> | |
| 4. <u>3(Southern) Army Area</u> | |
| a. 1 Infantry Div | Diwaniya |
| b. 5 Infantry Div | Basra |
| <p><u>Note.</u> Elements of 1 and 5 by Divs may have been involved in Kurdistan operations.</p> | |

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

9. Totals

130,000 personnel approx.

3 x Armoured Divisions

2 x Mountain Divisions

4 x Infantry Divisions (-)

2 x Independant Brigades

6. Equipments (approx)

Tanks:	T54/55	-	850
	T62	-	370
	PT 76	-	50
Assault guns (all types)		-	120
APC (all types)		-	1,400
Armoured cars (all types)		-	200
Arty	Frog SSM	-	?
	AAA (up to 57mm)	-	450
	AAA (over 57mm)	-	250
	Fd Arty (up to 100mm)	-	300
	Fd Arty (over 100mm)	-	425
	A/tk SNAPPER	-	?

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

AIR ORBAT

1. Main airfields at:

- a. H3.
- b. Kirkuk.
- c. Mosul.
- d. Al Kut.
- e. Shu'aiba.
- f. Habbaniyah Plain.
- g. Habbaniyah Plateau.
- h. Rashid.
- j. Muthanna.
- k. Ur Junction.

2. Totals

10,500 personnel approx.

160 (jet qualified) pilots.

3. Aircraft

	Hunters	-	28	
Fighters	Mig 17		65-70	
	Mig 21		94+	- Supersonic
	Mig 23		7+	- Supersonic
	Su 7		56+	
	Su 20		possibly 24	
Bombers	Tu 16		9	
	Tu 22		14	- Supersonic dash
	IL 18		12	
Transport	AN 12		9	
	AN 24		10	
	Dove		3	
	Heron		2	
	Mi 8		30 plus	
	Mi 6		6	

SECRET

NAVY ORBAT

1. Bases

At Basra and recent development at Umm Qasr.

2. Personnel

3,500.

3. Craft

OSA Fast Patrol Boats (with Styx missiles)	- 6
P6 Fast Patrol Boats	- 12
T43 Mine Sweepers	- 2
SO1 Sub chasers/Pc	- 3
Small river/inshore gunboats	- 12
Small auxiliaries	- 4

SECRET

(75)

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 15 AUG 1974 NBR 3/824/1

N W Browne Esq
British Embassy
TEHRAN

Your reference

Our reference

Date

15 August 1974

Dear Nick,

THE SHAH AND IRAQ

1 Thank you for your letter of 18 July on Iranian versions of the strength of the Iraqi armed forces and for the suggestion in your paragraph 3 that we might let you have an authoritative inventory of the main Iraqi armament.

2 I took this up with the Defence Intelligence Staff who have now let me have the enclosed paper containing information up to secret and providing the latest possible estimate of Iraqi strength.

3 As you will see, the enclosed does not always confirm that the Iranians invariably exaggerate Iraqi strength. While the DIS figures for bombers and tanks are comparatively modest (35 and 1270 respectively) the fighter total of 250+ with a possible further 24 SU20s indicates that Kayhan underestimated at least in this respect. However, the summary might be of selective use at the Ambassador's discretion with the Shah or Alam.

Yours ever
Peter.

P K Williams
Middle East Department

cc: Chancery, Baghdad
Captain D Norbury, DI4, MOD

Pa 20/8

SECRET

SECRET
SECRET

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

21 AUG 1974

NBR 3/324/1

76

SIGNAL
MESSAGE
FORM

Precedences
ACTION/INFO

DTG

FROM

*TO

*INFO

ROUTINE

16 1350

Z

Month

AUG

MODUK

BRITISH EMBASSY, TEHRAN

- 3 -
spaces

*USE A
SEPARA
LINE
FOR
EACH
ADDRESS

Line Feed
TEXT Security
Classification

DIG(s) Only

SECRET

Special Handling Caveat Only

DIG FOH

15

DI46 FOR BROWNE; LETTER FROM WILLIAMS .
(FCO) DATED 15 AUG 74 REFERS. TO ESTIMATE
OF IRAQI STRENGTH SHOULD BE ADDED REFERENCE
TO SAM 3; SAM 2; AND ZSU 23/4 AAA. VIZ
SAM 3: NUMBER OF SITES UNKNOWN BUT AT
LEAST SIX BELIEVED IN BAGHDAD AREA. SAM
PROBABLY HELD ON IRAQI ORBAT BUT NUMBER
AND SITES UNKNOWN. EVIDENCE OF ZSU 23/
AAA EXISTS BUT NUMBER OF BATTERIES AND
DEPLOYMENT UNKNOWN

Special Distribution
See note 9

File Reference

IN 307/5

DRAFTER'S NAME
(Block letters)

Jim NORBURY

Extension

2357

Branch

DI4

RELEASING OFFICER'S
Signature

[Signature]

Grade/
Rank

CAIT

Name
(Block letters)

NORBURY

Page ...
of ...
Pages

Have you referred to a
classified message ?
(Answer YES or NO in box)

YES

Security

SECRET

SWB

ME/4681/D/3

Relations with Iraq - Anti-Iranian Propaganda

Tehran home service 1630 gmt 16 Aug 74

Text of poorly received commentary:

Iran has often expressed its readiness to hold friendly talks with its neighbors, Iraq. For this reason Iran accepted the fact the political representatives of the two countries should sit around a table and attempt to solve their problems. Iraq, too, claims that it is ready to solve border problems between the two countries by peaceful means. However, coinciding with the meetings taking place between the representatives of the two countries in Istanbul, Iraq has resorted to a series of anti-Iranian propaganda attacks and in this way the Ba'th Government has once again proved that it does not wish to solve peacefully differences between the two countries.

According to a report from a representative of the National Iranian Radio and Television Organization the members of the Iraqi National Front, led by Na'im Haddad, gave a conference [ME/4677/A/1] at the Iraqi Cultural Centre in Beirut and spoke about Iraq's foreign policy, the question of the Kurds, Egypt, the PLO, Iran and differences with the Soviet Union.


About the Kurds Na'im Haddad said: Certain mercenaries in northern Iraq, who are tools of imperialist, Zionist and Iranian reactionary (?plans) wished to create an obstacle to the will of the nation. This group used to make use of Israeli and Iranian experts. Na'im Haddad said: Iraq's national measures aroused imperialist and Zionist fears and Iran's aggressions against Iraq's borders constitute the best proof of a plot against Iraq. Along with this the following things have taken place: Iran's aggression in the Persian Gulf; the occupation of three Arab islands; and the strengthening of Iranian hegemony in the Gulf waterways. Arab reactionaries, in partnership with Iranian reaction, are also attempting to crush the national movement in the Persian Gulf and to hatch plots against the PDRY.

About Iranian-Iraqi differences Na'im Haddad, the head of the delegation from the Iraqi National Front, said in Beirut: We know that the reactionary Iranian regime constantly attempts to send a number of emigrants to the Persian Gulf. An end should be put to this policy and Iran should be prevented from exerting its influence on our waters and territories in the Persian Gulf. Our problem with Iran is not that of the waters of the Shatt al-Arab. Our problem goes much deeper. Our problem is that Iranian reaction is a tool in the hands of the imperialists for crushing the Arab national movement. Of course this does not amount to the fact that should a government change its policy vis-a-vis us we, too, would not change our course [as heard]. Iran's internal situation and the stand adopted by that (?country) in that connection has caused Iran to insist always on sitting with us around a table. But when we discuss with Iran around a table on this subject we take along all our thoughts and projects and never make a concession on any of these. Na'im Haddad said: We know full well that Iran is strengthening the Right-wing of the Kurdish uprising.

In Brief

Cashiering of army officers Tehran radio on 15th August (1630 gmt) announced that five senior officers of the Imperial Ground Forces, including a Lieutenant General and two brigadiers, had been cashiered by a military tribunal for dishonesty and financial mismanagement.

[Note: Section D was last published in ME/4679.]



CONFIDENTIAL



British Embassy
Tehran

Copy: W S Wright
re para 2.
Mr Rundle Res. Dept.
Gulw pa
27/8.

P K Williams Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
27 AUG 1974
NBR 3/324/1

Your reference

Our reference 3/2

Date 22 August 1974

Dear Peter,

OUR TELEGRAM NO 424: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I asked Parvizian of the relevant MFA department yesterday how things were going at the talks in Istanbul. Parvizian said that they had been at it for ten days now and it was clear enough that both sides meant business. There was at least no question of a fiasco like the meeting at Foreign Minister level last August in Geneva. The next day or so would be crucial, as Khalatbari had just left (Tuesday) on an official visit to Turkey. If by today the two delegations at the talks thought that sufficient progress had been made to bring in the Foreign Ministers for some substantive decisions, Khalatbari would be on hand and his Iraqi colleague would also be able to travel quickly from Baghdad to join him.

2. Parvizian did not appear to be thinking in terms of a major break-through, eg a Shatt al-Arab settlement, even if the Foreign Ministers did get together. He said specifically that he was pessimistic about the Shatt al-Arab. As I had suggested earlier, the trouble was that there was little room for compromise on this issue. But Parvizian thought that there was a real prospect of formal assurances by both sides that they would not harrass the nationals of the other country living on their territory. The Iranians attached importance to this. Incidentally, according to local reports Moscow Radio has supported the Iranian line on the Shatt al-Arab. This fits in with the Shah's remarks reported in our telegram No 445 (not to all).

3. I asked Parvizian whether the boat had been rocked at all by the recent border clashes, which the Defence Attache reported to the Ministry of Defence in his telegram No FOH 960. Parvizian said that they had taken no notice of these provocations, nor for that matter of the hostile remarks made recently by Naim Haddad in Beirut. The Iraqi delegation in Istanbul had of course denied any knowledge of both the incidents and the Iranians had let things rest there. He personally subscribed to the theory that the Iraqi Government were at times unable to control how some of their people behaved.

cc:Chanceries: Baghdad,
Kuwait, Washington, Moscow,
Ankara, Consulate-General Istanbul,
Captain Norbury, D14, MOD

Yours sincerely
N W Browne

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 300

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 260700Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESK BY 270600Z

TOP COPY

REC-1/CD IN REGISTRY No 35 28 AUG 1974 NBR 3/324/1

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 303 OF 26 AUGUST ⁷⁴ INFO IMMEDIATE TO TEHRAN AND ROUTINE TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND KUWAIT.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 25/8 AND ASKED TO REPORT TO YOU URGENTLY IRAQ'S CONCERN AT RECENT INCIDENTS ON IRAQ/IRAN BORDER, WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN DEATH OF ONE IRAQI SOLDIER AND INJURIES TO OTHERS. IRAQI VERSION OF EVENTS IS SET OUT IN NOTE HANDED TO ME BY TAQA, COPIES OF WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO SECURITY GENERAL OF THE UN AND PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

COPY FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. TAQA SAID THAT MY WESTERN EUROPEAN AND ASIAN COLLEAGUES HAD ALSO BEEN INFORMED OF IRAQ'S POSITION BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUT HE HAD DECIDED TO SEE ME PERSONALLY BECAUSE OF

- (A) UK'S " HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT DISPUTE",
- (B) UK'S MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHERE WE HAD SUPPORTED RESOLUTION 348 UNDER THE AUSPICES OF WHICH TALKS WITH IRANIANS WERE NOW UNDER WAY IN ISTANBUL, AND
- (C) BECAUSE HE HAD TAKEN SERIOUSLY SIR DONALD MAITLAND'S STATEMENT IN APRIL THAT IRAQ AND UK SHOULD EXCHANGE VIEWS ON MATTERS OF COMMON POLITICAL CONCERN.

/3. AFTER REHEARSING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. AFTER REHEARSING EVENTS SET OUT IN NOTE, TAQA SAID HE WISHED YOU TO KNOW THAT, DESPITE IRANIAN PROVOCATION, IRAQ WOULD NOT GIVE UP ATTEMPTS TO SEEK ACCOMMODATION WITH IRAN AS REQUIRED BY RESOLUTION 348. IRAQ, THEREFORE, HAD NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING FROM TALKS. SHE WOULD NEVERTHELESS DEFEND HER SOVEREIGNTY TO HER UTMOST ABILITY. HE BELIEVED IRANIAN ACTION IN CONCENTRATING TROOPS ON BORDER WAS ATTEMPT TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM BARZANI, WHOSE SITUATION HE DESCRIBED AS DESPERATE.

4. TAQA ENDED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT (NOT) SEEKING ANY PARTICULAR ACTION BY HMG. HIS PURPOSE WAS SIMPLY TO KEEP YOU INFORMED.

I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT WHAT HE SAID .

GIDDENS

FILES

MED
NENAD
UND
PUSD
DEFENCE D
NEWS D
PS
PS/PUS
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

in the Middle East. Tel Aviv needed tension in the Middle East so as to have a pretext for postponing indefinitely all talks, including the Geneva conference on the Middle East, what could lead to an Israeli withdrawal and ensure a settlement of the Palestinian problem.]

Iraqi-Iranian Frontier Dispute

Moscow in Arabic 1700 gmt 23 Aug 74

Text of commentary:

News reports say that Iraqi and Iranian representatives met in Istanbul to draw up the agenda of the talks on solving the border issues between the two countries. An official statement published in this connection said, in part, that the talks would be held in accordance with the Security Council resolution of February 1974. It is known that the resolution calls on the two sides to begin talks as quickly as possible and solve their differences.

Needless to say, the news of the Istanbul meeting has been received with great satisfaction by all those who would sincerely like to see the peoples of the Near and Middle East live in peaceful and tranquil conditions. A just solution of the border disputes between Iraq and Iran will be a step toward the realization of this aim. It will also help the struggle of the people of this important area against the intrigues of imperialism and the reactionaries who always try to warm their hands by the fires of the disputes they spark off among nations.


It is noteworthy that the border dispute between Iraq and Iran is a result of the machinations of the old and new imperialists who follow the principle of "divide and rule". The imperialists have been doing their utmost to create border issues so that they can exploit these issues in the pursuit of their greedy aims.

The imperialists succeeded in dragging Iran into the CENTO military alliance which they established to combat the national liberation movement of the Near and Middle East peoples. It is known that the Western politicians believe that the CENTO alliance is a means for exerting pressure on Iraq, because the social and economic progressive changes which are taking place in Iraq and the policy which this country is actively pursuing against imperialism in the international arena has worried the imperialists.

The imperialists are not content with aggravating the border issue between Iraq and Iran. They are also trying to exploit the issue of the Kurds in Iraq, to obstruct the country's march on the path of progress. But they will not succeed in shaking the firm determination of the Iraqi people to pursue an independent national policy. All Iraq's sincere friends welcome this policy which Iraq is pursuing. Iraq's implementation of progressive measures is appreciated by the Soviet Union, which is developing its relations with Iraq on the basis of the treaty of friendship and co-operation.

It is worth mentioning that solving the Iraqi-Iranian border dispute will be in the interests of two countries which have so many things in common: Both are trying to solve the issue of under-development which they inherited from the colonialist era. Both countries are rich in oil. They must wage a stubborn struggle against the imperialist monopolies if they want to become masters of their own natural resources. Iraq and Iran, together with other OPEC member countries, have waged a successful struggle.

It is clear that continuing the process of consolidating joint action in the struggle against imperialism will be in harmony with the interests of both Iraq and Iran. The settlement of the Iraqi-Iranian border dispute will be a service to the peoples of the two countries and to all the peoples of the Near and Middle East who want to see their area an area of peace and tranquillity.



Rundpa
D 28/8.

80

PS

Sharm ash-Shaykh and Israeli Expansionism (SU/4686/A4/3)

Moscow in Arabic 16000 gmt 23 Aug 74

Text of commentary entitled "What encourages Israel in the spirit of expansionism?":

Israeli leaders are making increasingly insolent statements about territorial claims in occupied Arab territories. Yitzhaq Rabin, the Israeli Premier, recently stated that it was impossible to talk about Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank of the Jordan River. This was followed by a threat that Israel means to retain the town of Sharm ash-Shaykh and the neighbouring region in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula, where the Gulfs of Suez and Aqaba meet. This was announced by Yaakobi, the Israeli Transport Minister, whilst on a tour of southern Sinai. The Israeli authorities, he said, had changed the name of Sharm ash-Shaykh to the old Hebrew name Ofira. Aloni, the Director of the so-called Bureau for the Rehabilitation of South Sinai, spoke of plans for the development of Sharm ash-Shaykh; by 1st September the first families of Israeli settlers will be housed in that region. He said that a thousand families would be moved to that part in the coming four years, and 4,000 families in the following 10 years.

These are very far-reaching and extremely long-term plans indeed! Such statements clearly show that the present Israeli rulers do not even think about a Middle East settlement. The withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 has always been, and continues to be the indispensable condition for a Middle East settlement. If Israel intends to stay on in Sharm ash-Shaykh and not to allow the Egyptians to get there in 10 years time, this means that it will not be possible to reach any kind of settlement during this period and that the danger of a new war breaking out will loom large. Indeed, this was spoken of quite openly by Gur, Chief of Staff of the Israeli armed forces.

This is the result of the Israeli expansionist spirit. What is it that feeds it? A great number of factors are at work here, of course, but the chief factor is the continued assistance Israel is getting from abroad. Since their October defeats, the Israeli military have been receiving an increasing number of new, refreshing injections from across the Atlantic in the form of the most modern weapons and vast financial assistance. As Gur himself said recently, the level of the Israeli armed forces is higher today than it was last October, that is during last year's war in the Middle East. The flow of weapons and money from across the Ocean is not beset by any obstacles.

Incidentally, we must draw attention to another point: Not only are the Israeli rulers not particularly anxious about recent changes in the relations between the USA and some Arab countries, they even regard these as being to Israel's advantage since they create another channel for influencing the policy of Arab countries. This is particularly so inasmuch as the new elements, so to speak, in American-Arab relations have not resulted in any changes unfavourable to Israel in her own relations with the USA. Israel has been receiving and continues to receive all the necessary assistance for her aggressive policies, in even larger quantities than ever before. This is what encourages her, since Tel Aviv conceives of its policies in the Middle East primarily in terms of the assistance it gets from across the Ocean.

It is natural that in the present circumstances the call for unity is being sounded louder and louder in the Arab countries and that the matter of organizing resistance to those forces supporting the Israeli policy of aggression and expansion in the Middle East is being raised. Meanwhile a great number of Arab papers write that it is necessary to consolidate the joint front of the Arab countries and to revive its co-operation with all forces firmly and consistently supporting their just cause, in order to avoid "freezing" the status quo and to secure a just political settlement in the Middle East.

[Note: 'Za Rubezhom', as quoted by Tass (in English 1705 gmt 23 Aug 74), wrote of military preparations in Israel, claiming that Israel was intentionally whipping up tension

(81)



Iranian-Iraqi 23rd August Border Clash

(a) Baghdad home service 1906 gm 24 Aug 74

Text of report:

Our valiant border units have repelled an Iranian attack on the Iraqi Qaqa post in the Khanaqin area. A spokesman for the General Staff Headquarters has made the following statement:

Our valiant border units have repelled an Iranian attack on the Iraqi Qaqa post in the Khanaqin area. At 2100 yesterday, 23rd August, an Iranian military force launched a deliberate attack on the Iraqi post supported by mortar and machine-gun fire. Our border force returned the fire. The exchange continued until 0330 today. Our valiant forces were able to repel the attack and force the aggressors to retreat. One member of our border force unit was killed during the fighting. The losses of the aggressive Iranian side are not known. We strongly warn against such aggressive actions and declare that we will not allow any violation of our borders. We will repel every attack whatever its form by every possible means against our territory and sovereignty.

Note: Baghdad radio (0400 gm 26 Aug 74) said memoranda on "Iranian troop concentrations all along the border and the recent attack on the Qaqa post" has been given to foreign diplomats in Baghdad and sent to the UN.

(b) Tehran home service 1630 gm 24 Aug 74

Text of report that came in the "Radio Magazine" programme:

The two evening dailies carry two different news items. 'Keyhan' writes about the shelling of the Iranian outpost by Iraq, reporting on the new Iraqi aggression which began last night and lasted until 0330 hours this morning, and resulted, of course, in no loss of life. Printing a map on its first page, 'Keyhan' refers to the repeated Iraqi Ba'thists' incursions into Iranian soil. 'Ettela't', giving the news, reports on the killing of three people as a result of armed invasions by the Ba'thists.

Foreign Minister's Visit to Turkey

Tehran home service 1030 gm 25 Aug 74

Excerpts from report:

A statement has been issued at the end of the Iranian Foreign Minister Mr. Abbas-Ali Khalatbari's visit to Turkey at the invitation of the Turkish Foreign Minister. The statement says: The Iranian Foreign Minister was received by the Turkish President, HE Fahri Koruturk, and that he also met the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Ecevit. During their talks they discussed matters related to the whole range of current international issues, as well as purely regional and bilateral topics. The two Foreign Ministers initially exchanged views on matters related to the security and stability of the region, and renewed their pleasure over their common views on these issues and their bilateral co-operation within the regional organizations of CENTO and RCD, which have a clear influence on the stability of this region.

Regarding the Middle East crisis, the two Foreign Ministers reiterated their respective government's views. . .

In the course of reviewing the recent developments in Cyprus, the two Foreign Ministers expressed their belief in the urgent need to find a lasting solution based on the independence of the Cyprus Government and added that such a solution must necessarily guarantee the legitimate rights of the Greek and Turkish communities on the island.

In the course of discussions, the two Foreign Ministers confirmed that extensive opportunities exist for co-operation between the two countries, including co-operation in the economic field, particularly with regard to the construction of the Iran-Iskenderun gas trunkline, as well as in the fields of oil and petrochemical industry and in the farming and livestock industry. The two Foreign Ministers decided that these issues should be jointly discussed by the experts from the two countries and that the latter's recommendations should be passed on to the two countries' governments.

The two Foreign Ministers also stressed the need for developing communications facilities between the two countries, such as highway and railroad networks, as well as telecommunications systems to meet the growing demand in these fields. They expressed their decision to carry out extensive studies in this regard.

Mr. Khalatbari, who paid a visit to Turkey from 20th August, corresponding to 29 Mordad, to 24th August, corresponding to 2 Shahrivar, expressed his gratitude for the hospitality extended to him - the hospitality that manifests the friendly ties existing between the two countries. The Iranian Foreign Minister returned to Tehran last night.

In Brief: General

Cancellation of exercise for reservists (Text) The General Draft Board announced today [22nd August] that the field exercise for reservists had been cancelled until further notice. According to an earlier plan, Second Army reservists were to report to the Farah Abad training centre on Friday, 1st Shahrivar 1353 [23rd August 1974]. However the General Draft Board announced this evening that the exercise had been cancelled and that there was no need for the reservists to report to the Farah Abad training centre. (Tehran home service 1830 gmt 22 Aug 74)

[Note: Section D was last published in ME/4684.]

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Randje
AS 30/8



82

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11472
27 August 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 AUGUST 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to recall that the Government of the Republic of Iraq has expressed its sincerity and goodwill by declaring its acceptance of Security Council resolution 348 (1974), adopted on 28 May 1974. In fact, the Government of the Republic of Iraq began on its own initiative to negotiate with Iran in Istanbul with a view to setting up an agenda for the consideration of the outstanding problems between the two countries. These negotiations are still under way. Yet, the Iranian Government has continued to increase its troop concentration along the Iraqi Iranian frontier in violation of paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of resolution 348 (1974) which records the agreement of both countries to observe strictly the cease-fire agreement and to arrange for the prompt and simultaneous withdrawal of concentrations of armed forces along the entire border. The strength of the Iranian military build up along the border reached on 21 August three armoured divisions, two infantry divisions, and another independent infantry brigade, which constitute a large part of the Iranian army. At the same time, the Iranian air force and the rest of Iran's armed forces have been placed under maximum alert. On 22 August at 1635 local time, two Iranian air force fighters violated Iraq's air space by penetrating in depth at a speed of 700 miles per hour in the area of Rawanduz. On the night of 23/24 August, the Iranian armed forces supported by mortars launched a premeditated attack on the Iraqi border post of Al-Qa'qa in the region of Khanaqin. The Iraqi border guards repulsed that attack, in which one Iraqi guard was killed and several others wounded.

These Iranian acts of defiance to commitments entered into in good faith are being undertaken by the Iranian Government to frustrate the efforts aiming at the implementation of resolution 348 (1974) and the recommendations of the representative of the Secretary-General (document S/11291). This is a matter for which the Government of Iran bears full responsibility.

I would kindly request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Karim AL-SHAIKHLI
Permanent Representative




British Embassy
Tehran

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy: to Ruddle
Re: DGB 2/9.

Randpa
D 2/9

(83)



P K Williams Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 3/2

Date 29 August 1974

Dear Sir,

IRAN/IRAQ

✓ 1. There have been further border clashes this week extensively reported in the press, including, according to these reports, Iraqi shelling on 23 and 27 August. As you know from the Defence Attache's telegram No FOH 1017, this has resulted in elements of two Iranian armoured divisions being put on stand-by alert. The Iraqi initiative reported in Baghdad Telegram No 303, was also mentioned in the newspapers. We will be passing on to the Iranians the Iraqi statement that they would not give up attempts to seek accommodation with Iran as required by the United Nations Resolution 348.

2. Perhaps provoked by these developments, the Iranians have chosen to begin to publicise the presence of Kurdish refugees in Iran. The Head of the Red Lion and Son Society, Hossein Khatibi, announced on 27 August that his Society were supporting more than 70 thousand people. According to the report of his conference, the Red Lion and Son have notified the Red Cross and the High Commissioner for Refugees and asked them to send representatives to inspect the camps.

3. Meanwhile the talks in Istanbul are continuing. The Ambassador will be seeing Khalatbari shortly and will be able to ask him whether he had any contact with the Iraqis during his visit to Turkey. But it looks as if he did not.

Yours sincerely
N W Browne

cc: Chancery Baghdad

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

27 August 1974

P K Williams Esq
Middle East Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON

See later

IRAN/IRAQ

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

- 3 SEP 1974

NBR 3/324/1

(19)

1. Would you please refer to my telegram No 303 of 26 August in which I reported my interview with Taqa about incidents on the Iraq/Iran border.

attached.

2. I enclose a copy of the Note handed to me by the Minister (precisely similar copies of which have gone to all Mission here) and a translation. — *attached.*

3. The Minister was friendly and relaxed throughout the interview and frequently stressed his wish that the Secretary of State and Sir Donald Maitland should be informed of what he had to say. He was highly critical of the Shah, comparing him at one stage to Hitler. As I reported in my telegram, he said that despite what is said in the Note (paragraph 3), the Iraqis believe that Iran's objective was to divert attention from Barzani and the Kurds.

pass love

Bill Giddens

R G Giddens

cc: Chancery, Tehran
Chancery, Kuwait

Randpa
13/9

RESTRICTED

25 August 1974

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the British Embassy and has the honour to inform them that, at a time when Iraq expressed its sincerity and good intentions by accepting Security Council Resolution 348 of 28 May 1974, and had actually commenced negotiations in Istanbul in order to carry out without delay the Resolution by laying down an agenda to deal with the problems outstanding between Iraq and Iran, and at a time during which the two delegations are continuing their meetings to this end, and in violation of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Resolution which requires the strict observance of the cease-fire and immediate withdrawal of armed forces, the Iranian Government continued to consolidate its troop concentrations along the Iraqi/Iranian border. On the 21st of this month these amounted to three armoured divisions, two infantry divisions and two independent infantry brigades forming a large proportion of the Iranian Army. Iran has placed all the air bases on full alert and has alerted the remainder of the Iranian army units.

At 1635 hours on the 22nd of this month, Iranian aircraft violated Iraqi air-space deep within the Rawanduz area at speeds of 700 mph. During the night 23/24th of this month, Iranian military units, using light weapons supported by mortars, attacked the police post at Qaaqaa in Khanaqin district. The attack was resisted by the Iraqi police and led to the death of one Iraqi policeman and the wounding of others.

It is clear that the Iranian measures are intended to impede the efforts aimed at carrying out the Council's Resolution and the recommendations of the Secretary General's representative, and that the Iranian Government alone bears the responsibility for the outcome.

The MFA avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest appreciation and respect and requests the transmission of the contents of this Note to Her Majesty's Government.

No. 800
Date / / 197

25 8 4

الرقم /
التاريخ / ٨٠ / ١٩٧
٤ ٨ ٢٥

تهدي وزارة الخارجية تحياتها الى سعادة صاحبه اكبر له ببريطانية

وتتشرف ان تنهي اليها انه في الوقت الذي احرب فيه العراق عـــــــن

اخلاصه وحسن نية بقبول قرار مجلس الامن رقم ٣٤٨ في ٢٨ ايار ١٩٧٤

وشروعه فعلا بالتفاوض في استئناف مبادرة منه لتنفيذه بوضع جدول

اعمال لمعالجة المشاكل المتعلقة بين العراق وايران وفي الوقت الذي

يواصل فيه الوفدان اجتماعاتهما لهذا الغرض وخلافا لضمون الفقرتين

١ و ٢ من القرار المذكور واللتين تقضيان بالرعاية الدقيقة لوقف اطلاق النار

والانسحاب الفوري لحشود القوات المسلحة ، واصلت الحكومة الايرانية

تعزيز تحشداتها على طول الحدود العراقية الايرانية والتي بلغ

يوم ٢١ الجاري ثلاث فرق مدرعة وفرقتي مشاة ولواقي مشاة مستقلين تشكل

نسبة كبيرة من حجم الجيش الايراني ووضعت كافة القواعد الجوية فسي

اقصى درجات الانذار كما اندرت بقية قطعات الجيش الايراني .

وفي الساعة ١٦٣٥ من يوم ٢٢ الجاري اخترقت طائرتان ايرانيتان

حرمة الاجواء العراقية في الحق لمنطقة راوند وز وكانتا بسرعة ٧٠٠ ميل

في الساعة .

وفي ليلة ٢٣ / ٢٤ الجاري قامت وحدات عسكرية ايرانية بهجوم مستمر

بالاسلحة الخفيفة مسند بدافع الهاون على مخفر القمعاق في قاطع خانقين

صدته الشرطة العراقية وادى الى استشهاد شرطي عراقي وجرح آخرين .

ومن الواضح ان الاجراءات الايرانية يقصد بها عرقلة الجهود الرامية

الى تنفيذ قرار المجلس وتوصيات مثل السكرتير العام وهو امر تتحمله

الحكومة الايرانية وحدها نتاجه .

وفي الوقت الذي تنتهز فيه الوزارة هذه الفرصة للاعراب عن

تقديرها واحترامها ترجو ابلاغ ماتقدم الى حكومة صاحبة اكبر له ببريطانية

cc. Fco
Tehran
Kuwait
Bag



GR 600


PRIORITY

TOP COPY

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 041330Z SEPT

CONFIDENTIAL



TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 476 OF 4 SEPTEMBER/RPTD FOR INFO TO
ROUTINE BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UK MIS NEW YORK, UK MIS GENVA
AND ANKARA.

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. I DISCUSSED VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THIS SUBJECT WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHEN I SAW HIM ON 3 SEPTEMBER.
2. AS REGARDS THE TALKS IN ISTANBUL, KHALATBARI SAID THAT AGREE-
MENT HAD BEEN REACHED THAT THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD
MEET WHEN THEY WERE IN NEW YORK FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD
PROBABLY HAVE LEFT NEW YORK BY THE TIME HE, KHALATBARI, ARRIVED.
HE WOULD NOT GET THERE BEFORE THE END OF THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER
BECAUSE HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING THE SHAH ON HIS SERIES OF
STATE VISITS TO THE FAR EAST UNTIL THAT TIME. HE WAS SO INFORMING
THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE HOPE THAT THEY COULD ARRANGE
SOMETHING. THE ISTANBUL TALKS HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING IN TERMS
OF SUBSTANCE. THE IRAQIS HAD MADE THREE PROPOSALS ALL OF WHICH
THE IRANIANS HAD ACCEPTED. THE IRAQIS HAD IMMEDIATELY CHANGED
THEIR GROUND AND MODIFIED THEIR OWN PROPOSALS IN SUCH A WAY AS
TO MAKE THEM UNACCEPTABLE TO THE IRANIANS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3. WE

CONFIDENTIAL

3. WE THEN DISCUSSED KURDISTAN. KHALATBARI CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE NOW 72,000 KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRAN. THEY WERE BEING HOUSED IN TENTS AT QASR-I-SHIRIN. FOR THE MOMENT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT COULD COPE WITH THEM. THEY HAD ENOUGH MONEY AND THE WEATHER WAS STILL REASONABLY WARM. BUT THE ONSET OF WINTER WOULD CREATE GREAT HARDSHIP. BY THAT TIME, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES MIGHT WELL BE DOUBLED IF THE FIGHTING IN KURDISTAN CONTINUED TO GO IN FAVOUR OF THE IRAQI ARMY. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD INFORMED THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES OF THE SITUATION BUT HAD NOT ASKED HIM TO VISIT IRAN. IRAN DID NOT NEED FINANCIAL HELP FROM UNHCR - IN ANY CASE HE HAD LITTLE TO GIVE - AND THEY COULD COPE ADMINISTRATIVELY FOR THE TIME BEING. EQUALLY THEY KNEW THAT SADRUDDIN HAD PLENTY OF OTHER PROBLEMS, SUCH AS CYPRUS, ON HIS PLATE AT THE MOMENT.


4. AS REGARDS THE FIGHTING IN KURDISTAN, KHALATBARI SAID THAT THE KURDS WERE IN BAD SHAPE. WE WERE SEEING THE INEVITABLE OUTCOME OF AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN WELL-EQUIPPED REGULAR ARMED FORCES WITH ORGANISED BACK-UP AND SUPPLIES LINES, AND IRREGULAR FORCES LACKING A PROPER SUPPLY ORGANISATION. THE IRAQIS WERE TRYING THEIR HARDEST TO FINISH OFF THE KURDS BEFORE THE ONSET OF WINTER SINCE THEY KNEW THAT THE KURDS WOULD STAGE A RECOVERY NEXT SPRING IF THEY FAILED TO DO SO. KHALATBARI SEEMED TO FEEL THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT WELL SUCCEED IN THEIR OBJECTIVE. IF THEY DID, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRAN ? WOULD THEY EVER BE ABLE TO GO HOME ? HE FORESAW, AMONGST OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF AN IRAQI VICTORY, THE GROWTH OF ANOTHER INTRACTABLE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROBLEM.

PARSONS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

MED
UND
FRD
N AM D
IRD
RES D (AM SECT)
MOD INTERNAL

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Randpa
12/6/9

HR T J Clark
Middle East Dept
(86)

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11486
4 September 1974
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 3 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 27 August 1974 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations (S/11472) and to bring the following to your attention.

Although resolution 348 (1974) takes note of a bilateral agreement between Iraq and Iran, the Iraqi authorities still seem, in practice, to be bent only on interpreting that agreement in a unilateral manner.

Thus, by referring to so-called concentrations of Iranian troops along the frontier, they hope to divert attention from the movements of Iraqi armed forces towards our frontier - movements which have increased in scale particularly of late.

Furthermore, as I stated in my letter dated 27 August 1974, even while negotiations were taking place at Istanbul between the Iranian and Iraqi delegations, Iraqi forces were committing fresh acts of provocation against Iran, violating our air space and our territory, and were opening fire, with artillery, mortar and machine-guns, on the inhabitants of the Iranian frontier regions.

The letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq reports the death of one Iraqi, but makes no mention of the number of Iranian civilians who have been victims of acts of Iraqi aggression.

The Iraqi authorities also seem to forget the many problems created for Iran over the past several months by the continual influx of Iraqi Kurds fleeing from the military operations and bombardments of their villages, fields and pasture lands. These refugees, all of whom are women, children and old people, and of whom there are already more than 72,000, are being cared for by the Society of the Red Lion and Sun which has, for this purpose, been obliged to ask the Government for additional funds currently amounting to \$100 million. As is usual, the Society has also informed, in good time, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who have sent their representatives to visit the numerous reception centres.

It is curious to note that each time that a gleam of hope of bilateral negotiations appears, the Iraqi authorities appeal to the Security Council.

S/11486

English

Page 2 .

Last February, at the very time when diplomatic relations between the two countries had just been resumed and when the newly arrived ambassador of Iraq was presenting his credentials, the Iraqi Government was making an unfounded allegation against my country before the Council. Now, scarcely has the first round of bilateral negotiations been completed, than the Permanent Representative of Iraq feels the need to write to the President of the Security Council in order to bring fantastic accusations against Iran. This tactic on the part of the Iraqi authorities clearly shows who is endeavouring to undermine the effort to find a solution to our differences and to prevent the implementation of the bilateral agreement concluded last April between our two Governments.

I would request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fereydoun HOVEYDA
Permanent Representative

MOD DISTRIBUTION

(87)

E 023 /3

MED

LLC NR 951/08


PP MODUK

GRS 150

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 080847Z

CONFIDENTIAL



100's

Mr. Williams

no.
29/9

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO FOH 1048 080847Z SEP.
FOR DIA FROM DA.

1. KAYHAN FOR 7 SEP CARRIES FRONT PAGE NEWS OF TWO IRAQI PLANES BOMBING IRANIAN VILLAGE KOHNEH LAHIJAN NEAR PIRANSHAH. FIFTEEN CIVILIANS REPORTED KILLED PLUS SEVERAL WOUNDED AND HOUSES DESTROYED. TWO PLANES FROM A FOUR PLANE RAIDING PARTY ARE REPORTED AS HAVING DROPPED THE BOMBS.


2. KAYHAN 8 SEP REPORTS THAT DURING IRAQI OFFENSIVES AGAINST KURDS DURING THE PAST MONTH, IRAQI FORCES HAVE SUFFERED MORE THAN 3,000 (THREE THOUSAND) CASUALTIES. THIS REPORT IS ATTRIBUTED TO ARAB WORLD DIGEST BUT IS BASED ON KURDISH CLAIMS. IT PUTS PESH MERGA LOSSES AS 131 KILLED AND 282 WOUNDED. THIS EXCLUDES CIVILIANS.

3. ALTHOUGH THE BORDER CLASHES IN THE AREA QASR-E-SHIRIN AND SOUTH CONTINUE AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSES WHO SINS AGAINST WHO, THE BOMBING REPORTED IN PARA ONE SEEMS INDEFENSIBLE UNLESS THE AIRCRAFT WERE LOST. WE BELIEVE THE IRAQ ARMY ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO SEAL OFF IRANIAN SUPPLIES TO KURDS BY PUSHING UP AND OCCUPYING BORDER AREA. THIS MAY BE BY PRODUCT OF THIS STRATAGEM.

PARSONS

BT

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



*Middle East Dept
via C/Bag.*



38

*Radja
10/9*

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11494
6 September 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO
THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations of 28 August (S/11476), I have the honour to inform you, Mr. President, that Iraq continues to be bound by the provisions of Security Council resolution 348 (1974). As a proof of its adherence to the said resolution and its good intention in implementing its provisions, Iraq took the initiative in calling for a meeting of the Iraqi and Iranian sides in order to prepare the necessary arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of resolution 348. The Istanbul meeting of 12 August 1974 of the two parties was a direct result of the Iraqi initiative. However, at the same time the two parties were talking, the Iranian authorities continued to amass its troops on the border and furthermore committed a number of flagrant violations against the Iraqi borders. The premeditated attack of the night of 23/24 August, which I referred to in my letter of 27 August (S/11472), is but one of a series of such attacks, violations, and infringements on Iraq's territorial sovereignty by Iran. I am taking the liberty to enclose an annex giving details of the Iranians' violations and infringements that occurred during the month of August alone.

The Government of Iraq had at an earlier occasion, reaffirmed its good faith and its earnest determination to solve the outstanding problems between the two countries, by asking the Iranian Government to form a joint commission to lay down the necessary arrangements for the withdrawal of the concentration of troops from the border area in conformity with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 348 (1974). Iran as yet has not replied to this initiative.

My Government categorically denies all the false accusations appearing in the letter of the Permanent Representative of Iran and we express our regrets that he saw fit to send such a letter at a time when the two sides in Istanbul were able to reach a preliminary agreement on points to be discussed later at a higher level. We believe that this agreement can be a positive starting point towards solving the outstanding problems.

Iraq's reaffirmation of its strict adherence to Security Council resolution 348 (1974) and its intention to implement its provisions fully and in good faith also entails that Iran too should in its turn be bound by the said resolution and in the same spirit. Iran's position must not be one of casting doubts on the provisions of the resolution and it should not embark on actions that can only

create difficulties in the face of the concrete efforts for the solving of the outstanding problems between Iraq and Iran, which is the aim of Security Council resolution 348.

I would kindly request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Karim AL-SHAIKHLY
Permanent Representative

Annex

A list of detailed account of violations committed by Iranian armed forces against Iraqi frontier and police posts during the month of August 1974.

1. On 1 August 1974 at 1800 hours local time Iranian forces shelled the Iraqi encampment at Qarrto Too in Deiyalah area, using heavy artillery. Heavy material damage was sustained.
2. On the night 23/24 August at 2100 hours local time Iranian armed forces launched a premeditated attack on the Iraqi border post of Al-Qa'qa. Mortar and 82 mm calibre field guns were used. One Iraqi policeman was killed while several were wounded.
3. On 26 August at 1800 hours local time Iranian forces resumed their attack on Al-Qa'qa post. This time mortar and light weapons were used.
4. On the same day (26 August) at 2000 hours local time Iranian armed forces launched a premeditated attack on the Iraqi border post at Karboolah Beljfet.
5. Iranian forces resumed their attack on the same post once more on 27 August at 1430 hours local time. This time heavy artillery was used.
6. On the same day (27 August) at 1430 hours local time Iranian forces carried out yet another attack on Al-Qa'qa post.
7. On the morning of 27/28 August at 0500 hours local time Iranian artillery shelled the outlying perimeter of Al-Qa'qa post as also Al Semood post.
8. On the morning of 29 August at 0130 hours local time, Iranian forces launched yet another premeditated and treacherous attack on Al-Qa'qa, Al Semood and Tal Al Wasat posts. Two policemen were wounded in the attack on Al Semood post.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL



Handwritten:
Rundpc
R 10/9

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11498
6 September 1974
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 6 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention:

According to information communicated by the competent authorities of the Iranian Government, on 6 September, at 8 a.m. (local time), four Iraqi military aircraft appeared over Piranshahr and, meeting with opposition from the anti-aircraft unit established in that area, were forced to turn back. Two of these aircraft flew into Iranian territory to the south of Piranshahr and dropped four bombs on the defenceless village of Kohné-Lahijan, killing 15 inhabitants (9 of whom were children aged between 6 months and 12 years) and injuring 3 others. In the course of this act of aggression, six houses were completely destroyed and many others damaged. Two bombs were also dropped on the urban centre of Ghaletarach, six kilometres south-east of Kohné-Lahijan. Pieces of these bombs, clearly showing of what kind they are, are being kept in the area.

As I informed you in my letters of 27 August and 3 September 1974 (S/11476, S/11486), in spite of the bilateral agreement reached between the two countries, the Iraqi authorities recently continued to commit further violations of our frontiers and our air space, even while the negotiations between the Iranian and Iraqi delegations were in progress at Istanbul.

We protest strenuously against this morning's bloody aggression, which the international community must unequivocally condemn. Such indescribable acts are not only profoundly inhuman but also constitute serious violations of our territory. Their continuation can only lead to a highly dangerous situation for the consequences of which Iraq must assume full responsibility.

I would request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fereydoun HOVEYDA
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



PW (MED)
Ruedig
Distr.
GENERAL



S/11486
4 September 1974
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 3 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 27 August 1974 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations (S/11472) and to bring the following to your attention.

Although resolution 348 (1974) takes note of a bilateral agreement between Iraq and Iran, the Iraqi authorities still seem, in practice, to be bent only on interpreting that agreement in a unilateral manner.

Thus, by referring to so-called concentrations of Iranian troops along the frontier, they hope to divert attention from the movements of Iraqi armed forces towards our frontier - movements which have increased in scale particularly of late.

Furthermore, as I stated in my letter dated 27 August 1974, even while negotiations were taking place at Istanbul between the Iranian and Iraqi delegations, Iraqi forces were committing fresh acts of provocation against Iran, violating our air space and our territory, and were opening fire, with artillery, mortar and machine-guns, on the inhabitants of the Iranian frontier regions.

The letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq reports the death of one Iraqi, but makes no mention of the number of Iranian civilians who have been victims of acts of Iraqi aggression.

The Iraqi authorities also seem to forget the many problems created for Iran over the past several months by the continual influx of Iraqi Kurds fleeing from the military operations and bombardments of their villages, fields and pasture lands. These refugees, all of whom are women, children and old people, and of whom there are already more than 72,000, are being cared for by the Society of the Red Lion and Sun which has, for this purpose, been obliged to ask the Government for additional funds currently amounting to \$100 million. As is usual, the Society has also informed, in good time, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who have sent their representatives to visit the numerous reception centres.

It is curious to note that each time that a gleam of hope of bilateral negotiations appears, the Iraqi authorities appeal to the Security Council.

Last February, at the very time when diplomatic relations between the two countries had just been resumed and when the newly arrived ambassador of Iraq was presenting his credentials, the Iraqi Government was making an unfounded allegation against my country before the Council. Now, scarcely has the first round of bilateral negotiations been completed, than the Permanent Representative of Iraq feels the need to write to the President of the Security Council in order to bring fantastic accusations against Iran. This tactic on the part of the Iraqi authorities clearly shows who is endeavouring to undermine the effort to find a solution to our differences and to prevent the implementation of the bilateral agreement concluded last April between our two Governments.

I would request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fereydown HOVEYDA
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Mr. W. ...
Y. 13/9
R. 13/9
S

91

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11504
11 September 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I wish to refer to the letter addressed to you on 4 September 1974 by the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations (document S/11494 of 6 September 1974).

The latest Iraqi letter is another deceptive move, calculated, in plain naïvety, to beguile the Security Council and convince it of the Iraqi Government's peaceful intentions. But that Government's actions belie its insidious words. While the representative of Iraq speaks of his Government's peace initiatives, the Iraqi planes hurl bombs on Iranian villages, killing scores of women and children and wounding others (see document S/11498 of 6 September 1974). While he confirms here in New York his country's adherence to provisions of the bilateral agreement, back in isolated frontier zones shelling of Iranian posts has become a daily routine of the Iraqi troops. At the same time that the delegations of the two countries sit at the negotiating table, Iraqi terrorists sneak their way through the Iranian border, under the cover of darkness, to massacre three villagers in their beds (see annex to document S/11476 of 28 August 1974). Finally, by referring to concentrations of Iranian troops along the frontier, the Iraqi representative conveniently ignores the massing of his own Government's troops, to which I had occasion to refer in my letters of 27 August and 3 September 1974 (S/11476 and S/11486).

This regrettable habit of duplicity - of which the misrepresentation of Security Council resolution 348 (1974) is another example - reflects a peculiar mentality from which the relations of the two countries have badly suffered.

In a reversal of facts, the Iraqi representative complains about "premeditated attack" by Iran on the night of 23/24 August 1974. The actual sequence of events of Iraqi border violations prior to, and on that date, has been attached to my letter of 27 August 1974. To test the accuracy of the Iraqi statement, however, it is fitting to recall that on 12 February of this year, the representative of Iraq requested a meeting of the Security Council following a bloody border clash along the Irano-Iraqi frontier on 10 February. Later investigation by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General made it plain that the scene of that major incident had actually been the territory of Iran against whom the complaint had been launched (document S/11291, annex I, para. 35).

The Iraqi representative's letter is revealing in some other respects:

His conspicuous and repeated attempts to cash in on the so-called Iraqi initiative for the Istanbul talks, while misleading as an unqualified statement, suggest that more than in their substance, the Iraqi Government is interested in propaganda to be derived from those talks. In a show of goodwill, Iran agreed to hold these talks in Istanbul in accordance with the bilateral agreement reached between the two Governments last April. This was done in spite of the fact that Iraq was then flouting - as indeed it is doing to this very date - provisions of the same agreement, provisions which were deemed to be preliminary to the beginning of the talks. This is the context within which the question of participation of the two States in the Istanbul talks should properly be viewed. An old proverb says, "one swallow does not make a summer", and so if the request of the Istanbul talks was an initiative by Baghdad, so was the dispatch of planes to kill children and to maim the peaceful villagers of Kahne-Lahijan.

Iran continues to adhere to the above-mentioned bilateral agreement and is desirous of maintaining the momentum created by the success of the initial talks in Istanbul. It earnestly hopes that the Government of Iraq shall be guided in its future actions by the same spirit.

I would request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fereydoun HOVEYDA
Permanent Representative of Iran
to the United Nations

FO 876 E 112/26
LLC NR 324/26
PP MODUK
GRS 220

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 27 SEP 1974 NBR 3/324/1

CYPHER CAT A
FM TEHRAN 260945Z

MOD DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

TO PRIORITY MODUK TEL NO FOH 1135 OF 260945Z SEP.

MED

N. B. ...

FOR DIA FROM AMA.
IRANIAN DEPLYMENT ON IRAQI BORDER.
YOUR FOH OF 091610Z SEP.

1. AS EXPECTED DA'S TALK WITH BOROOMAND OF J2 REVEALED NOTHING ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. VIRTUALLY ONLY SOURCE OF INFO TO US IS MATERIAL ALREADY AVAILABLE TO YOU.


3. ONLY LOCAL COLOUR I CAN ADD IS ON 224 TK BN. THIS BN HAS RECEIVED ITS CHIEFTAINS, BUT THEY DEFINITELY DID NOT (NOT) DEPLOY THEM ON/NEAR BORDER. THE M 47S HOWEVER HAVE NOT BEEN WITHDRAWN YET, AND WE KNOW THEY HAVE BEEN AWAY, DONE '' A LOT OF MILEAGE, '' AND RETURNED TO HAMADAN.

4. MY ONLY (RATHER OBVIOUS) COMMENT IS THAT UNITS FROM ALL OVER THE PLACE (LESS 77 DIV APART FROM ONE VERY MINOR UNIT) ARE ROTATED IN THE BORDER AREA, NOT NECESSARILY UNDER COMMAND OF THEIR PEACE-TIME FORMATIONS.

I CANNOT SUBSTANTIATE DAS SUGGESTION OF A BORDER/COORDINATING HQ - SEE PARA 4 OF 103/DA OF 19 SEP. FROM WHAT I READ CONTROL SEEMS TO BE EXCERCISED BY HQ IIGF DIRECT TO DIVISIONS.

PARSONS
BT

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



MR T J. Clark
D.E. Dept.
via Conf By



(93)

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11518
24 September 1974

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter addressed to you on 11 September 1974 by the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations (S/11504), I would like to state that I do not wish to take the valuable time of the members of the Council with a detailed reply to the contents of the Iranian letter, to comment on its tone and language, or on its distortions, especially in its interpretation of paragraph 35 of the Secretary-General's report. I shall merely refer the members of the Council to my previous communications concerning the situation on the Iraqi-Iranian borders.


It is most regrettable that these borders have witnessed over the last few months, and continue to witness, what amounts to an almost daily violation of the territorial integrity of Iraq. The Iraqi authorities have informed their Iranian counterpart of Iraq's readiness to establish a joint commission for the withdrawal of their respective troop concentrations from the border areas. The Iranian Government has not yet replied to the Iraqi proposal.

In bringing these facts before the Council, Iraq is not interested in scoring propaganda points; it is only interested in informing the Council of the real developments in the situation and in confirmation of Iraq's seriousness and good faith in implementing Security Council resolution 348 (1974). We hope and expect that the Iranian Government would act in the same spirit.

I would kindly request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Karim AL-SHAIKHLY
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr. *Mr. Braden*
GENERAL

S/11527
October 1974 *4/10*

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 OCTOBER 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAN TO
THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to refer to the letter addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations on 20 September 1974 (S/11518 of 24 September 1974). *(93)*

The points repeated in the latest Iraqi communications are fully covered in my previous letter dated 11 September 1974 (S/11504). The Iraqi representative makes no effort to substantiate - and merely repeats - the same old unfounded accusations against my Government. Meanwhile, the Iraqi troops along the frontiers of the two countries step up their provocation and violation of Iranian territory. *(91)*

What excites attention in the latest Iraqi communication, however, is the unabashed silence of that Government over the massacre of Kohne-Lahijan which gave rise to my letter of 6 September 1974 (S/11498), a letter which the Iraqi representative conveniently ignores. In the same vein, the Iraqi Government passes in silence the contents of my letter of 3 September 1974 (S/11486), in which I referred to problems created for my Government as a result of mass exodus of Iraqi Kurdish refugees fleeing from cruel bombardments of the Iraqi army. *(92)*

I would be grateful if this letter can be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fereydoon HOVEYDA
Permanent Representative of Iran
to the United Nations

RESTRICTED

(95)




BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

24 October 1974

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON



Enter
! h. Bowyer 31/10
R 28/10

See Graham

IRAQ/IRAN

1. I enclose a cutting from the 23 October edition of the "Baghdad Observer", reporting that negotiations between Iraq and Iran will be resumed in the near future. It is of interest that, though said to have been released on 16 October in New York, it was not until 23 October that the announcement was made here.

2. The Iranian Ambassador told me yesterday, however, that there was no truth in this report. His understanding was that the talks in New York had started off well, but that the late Mr Taqa's remarks during the course of his speech to Plenary (see pages 16 et seq of the provisional verbatim record of the 2262nd meeting of the Assembly) had caused the Iranians to decline to continue further talks. He was not aware that his Government had changed their attitude. *But he may be ill informed.*

Just see
dit
R G Giddens

cc: Chancery
TEHRAN


cc: UKMIS
NEW YORK

RESTRICTED



British Embassy
Tehran

P K Williams Esq
MED
FCO



Your reference

Our reference 3/2

Date 23 October 1974

Dear Peter,

IRAN/IRAQ

1. We found your letter of 15 August, enclosing the paper on Iraqi military strength, most useful. Basing themselves on this, the Defence Attache and his colleagues produced a paper, a copy of which I enclose, comparing the Iranian and Iraqi orders of battle. You will see that they draw the conclusion that the Iranian Armed Forces are scarcely numerically superior to those of Iraq and that the Iraqis have more heavy equipment of certain types.

2. Since our photocopying facilities for secret documents are rudimentary, I would be grateful if you would arrange for a copy of the enclosure to be sent to Captain Norbury in D14, MOD and Chancery Baghdad.

Yours sincerely
NW

N W Browne

Encl

*I think para 2 of the comments att'd
just about sums it up; a stand off.*

Enter

copy Capt Norbury D14 MOD.

SECRET R. Giddens. Baghdad.

Mr R. Giddens 29/X

29/X
28/X

SECRET

Comparison of Iranian and Iraqi ORBATs

(NOTE: The figure from various sources for Iraq do vary: I have used those supplied by the DIS)

GROUND FORCES

	<u>IRAN</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>
Total Strength	180,000	130,000
Armoured Divs	3	3
Infantry Divs	5 (incl Guards)	4
Mountain Divs	-	2
Independent Bdes	2	2
Tanks, heavy	760 (450 more Chieftains to come)	1,220
Tanks, medium	400	-
Tanks, light	30 (330 more Scorpions to come)	50
Armoured cars	-	200
APCs	approx 2,000	1,400
Assault guns	-	120
Arty. Froz SSM	-	1
Fd Arty (up to 100mm)	-	300
md Arty (over 100mm)	590	425
BM21 122mm missile launcher	55	-
Helicopters, Armed	- (200 on order)	Not Known
Troop Carrying	38 (200 on order)	Not Known
Recco/Communications	39 (100 on order)	Not Known
Heavy lift	4 (more on order)	Not Known

SECRET

Conclusions

1. It is difficult to conclude that either army is overwhelmingly superior to the other in purely material terms, except that the Iranians have an advantage in the artillery branch both numerically and in calibre: for example, the IIGF has about 70 US 8-inch howitzers and 38 x 175mm SP guns. I do not think the Iraqis can match this. The Iranians are also, I suspect, well ahead in their Army helicopter fleet, and shortly their lead in this field will be massive.

On balance, the Iranians would seem to have a slight edge except in heavy armour.

2. Having read the AA's and NA's conclusions, it would seem that neither country has a sufficiently significant superiority in any arm or service to be able to launch an offensive with any certainty of success; the difficult country on the border, allied to command and logistic weaknesses, makes this even more probable. Either country should be able to defend itself, provided it is not taken completely by surprise.

SECRET

Comparison of Iranian and Iraqi ORBATs

AIR FORCES

1. Main Airfields

<u>IRAN</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>
Tehran/Mehrabad	H3
Tabriz	Mishan
Hamadan/Shahroki	Mosul
Dezful/Vahdati	Al Kut
Bushehr	Shu'aiba
Shiraz	Habbaniya Plain
Agha Jari *	Habbaniya Plateau
Isfahan *	Rashid
Bandar Abbas *	Muthanna
Chah Bahar *	Ur Junction
Mashad *	
Jask *	
* Being developed	
<u>TOTAL: 12</u>	<u>TOTAL: 10</u>

2. Personnel

Service	42,285	10,500 approx
Civilians	4,924	
Under Training	10,065	
	<u>57,274</u>	

Pilots	Not known, but certainly many more than 160	160 (Jet qualified pilots)
--------	---	----------------------------

3. Aircraft

Fighter

Fighter/Ground Attack

82 x F5 A & B
(Being phased out)
20+ x F5E approx
(Will build up to 141)

28 x Hunters

65-70 x Mig 17

94+ x Mig 21 (Supersonic)

7+ x Mig 23 (Supersonic)

56+ x Su 7

Fighter/Bomber

86 x F4 D & E
(A further 39 order)

possibly 24 x Su 20

TOTAL: 200 approx

TOTAL: 200 approx

SECRET

Aircraft (Cont'd)

IRAN

IRAQ

Rapoe

12 x RF5A
4 x RF4
1 x P3C Orion LRMP
(Total of 6 on order)

**Counter Insurgency
Ground Attack**

10 x O2A (Piston engined)

Bomber

Nil

9 x TU 16
14 x TU 22 (Supersonic dash)
12 x IL 28

TOTAL: 35

Transport

60 x C130 (Hercules)
13 x F27 (Fokker
Friendship)
12 miscellaneous
light transport aircraft
2 x Boeing 707-320C-
Transport/Tanker
(Total of 6 on order)

9 x AN 12
10 x AN 24
3 x Dove
2 x Heron

TOTAL: 87

TOTAL: 24 approx

Helicopters

2 x CH47 (Chinook)
20 x HH43 (SAR)
4 x AB206A (JRT Ranger)

30+ x M 18
6 x M 16

Trainers

8 x T33A (Jet)
10 x F33A (Bonanza)

Air Defence Artillery

Deployed:

Tigercat 24 fire units
Super
Fledermaus 66 fire units
ZSU 23-2 348 fire units

SAM 2 ?
SAM 3 ?
ZSU 23-4

On Order:

Rapier 54 fire units
Hawk 25 Batteries

Conclusion

1. In jet fighter strength the Iraq Air Force at present has the advantage. Although in quality their Mig 17s and Hunters are no match for the F5s (particularly the F5Es) or the F4 Phantoms of the IIAF. The Mig 21s and SU 7s are a great deal better but are still somewhat outclassed. On the other hand the Mig 23 is a very potent, modern fighter and if well handled would present the IIAF with a serious problem. The IIAF has no bomber force as such. The TU 22 is an advanced bomber but could be intercepted and destroyed by the Phantom.
2. If the figure of only 160 trained jet pilots in the Iraq Air Force is correct then they would be unable to make full use of their force. The IIAF has no combat experience whereas the Iraq Air Force must have a large number of pilots who have at least fired their guns in anger and had the experience of being shot at.
3. To summarise I believe that in a defensive operation the IIAF would probably have the advantage but if they tried to cover an invasion of Iraq the air battle would be very much in the balance and might well go in favour of the Iraqis. The performance of both forces would very much depend on the continued support of their respective Champions - the USSR and the USA.

SECRET

Comparison of Iranian and Iraqi ORBATs

NAVAL ORBATs

	<u>IRAN</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
1. <u>Bases</u>			
	KHORRAMSHAHR (Naval Base)	BASRA	Under mutual surveillance
	KHOSROWBAD (Hovercraft Base)		Under mutual surveillance
		UMM QASR	
	KHARG Is (Hovercraft and Helo Base)		
	BUSHIRE (Naval and Helo Base)		
	BANDAR ABBAS (Main Naval Base)		
2. <u>Personnel</u>	16,000 (3/74)	3,500	Inc. Civilians

Note: IIN building up at about 2-3,000 pa. By 1980, IIN needs 25,000 uniformed personnel plus 15,000 civilians.

3. **Ships**

Destroyers

ARTEMIZ	Nil
4 Vosper Mk V	
2 ex-US Allen Sumner Class	

Frigates/Corvette

4 US Patrol Frigates	3 Soviet (SO-1)
----------------------	-----------------

Coastal Minesweepers

4 elderly US Minesweepers (1 in Caspian for Training)	2 elderly Soviet Minesweepers
---	-------------------------------

Inshore Minesweepers

2 US MS1	Nil
----------	-----

Fast Patrol Boats

Nil	6 USSR OSA Class with STIX missiles
Nil	12 USSR P6 Class

SECRET

(Cont'd)

IRAN

IRAQ

COMBAT

Patrol Boats
(20-25 Kt range)

10 ex USN and W. Germany

Small river/inshore
gunboats

12 ex USN YP Class

12 mixed bag

Repair Ship

CHAH BAHAR

Nil

Other Auxiliaries

Oiler

Water Carrier

1 LCV

4 LCM

4 small

Navalcraft

2 BH 7

Nil

8 SRN 6

Unarmed

Unarmed

Helicopters

? AB 205

? AB 212

SEA KING

Not Known

SECRET

Comments

1. Judging by the types of ships it is assessed that the roles of the two Navies are quite different. For the IIN the prime purpose must be anti-submarine warfare to keep the oil route open (an amphibious capability is also being developed). The Iraqi Navy's main role is anti-shipping.
2. With their superior speed and their STYX missiles, the Iraqi OSAs could probably sink any IIN surface ship but the IIN helicopters might be able to take out the OSAs with air-to-surface missiles (though this seems doubtful in their present state of the art).
3. The IIN has no mining capability and their mine countermeasures capability is rusty. It is not known whether the Iraqis have mines: if they do possess them, they could easily sow them from dhows etc off the mouth of the KARUN river, in the vicinity of KHARG, off the approaches to BUSHIRE and BANDAR ABBAS, and thus bottle up the entire IIN.
4. Should there be a land-air battle, one might expect to see the IIN surface ships withdrawn to the STRAITS OF HORMUZ area to avoid destruction by the Iraqi FPBs, which the Iranians would probably try to destroy by naval helos or IIAF aircraft, the latter now being trained in this role.

CONFIDENTIAL

(97)

Mr. Williams 11/XI
Enter 2/11
11/11

R G Giddens Esq
BAGHDAD

3/2

5 November 1974

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 11 NOV 1974 NBR 3/324/1

IRAN/IRAQ

1. Thank you for sending us a copy of your letter of 24 October to Graham Burton about the recent Iran/Iraq negotiations.


2. It is perhaps just worth reporting that the MFA told us on 24 October that the meeting in New York between Khalatbari and his late Iraqi colleague had given no cause for hope that a break-through might be achieved in any of the problems in relations between the two countries. We were also told that there were no plans for the talks to be resumed.

P J Westmacott

cc G S Burton Esq, MED, FCO
UKMIS New York

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 220
PRIORITY
EN CLAIR
FM MOSCOW 191415Z
UNCLASSIFIED



98

Top copy entered
on NBP 26/1

"MOVEMENTS OF
SHAH OF IRAN"

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1367 OF 19.11.74 REPTD FOR INFO
PRIORITY TO TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, ROUTINE WASHINGTON, JEDDA,
CAIRO, TELAVIV, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT AND AMMAN.

15/11/74
pa

M I P T. IRAN /USSR - SHAH'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PODGORNYY'S REMARKS ABOUT IRAN/
IRAQ RELATIONS.

" IN OUR TIMES, CHARACTERISED BY CLOSE WORLD-WIDE LINKS,
ANY SEAT OF TENSION INFLUENCES THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
GENERALLY. IF, LET US SAY, SOMEWHERE IN ASIA - IN THE SOUTH
EAST OR SOUTH OF THAT CONTINENT, IN THE MIDDLE OR NEAR EAST,
IN THE PERSIAN GULF ZONE, OR IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ,
SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN STATES PERSIST, THEN THIS
OF COURSE CANNOT HELP POISONING THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE
WORLD GENERALLY. PROCEEDING FROM THIS, WE WISH TO STATE
IN ALL FRANKNESS THAT THE TENSION EXISTING IN RELATIONS
BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ DOES NOT MEET THE INTERESTS OF THE
CAUSE OF PEACE, AND WE HAVE ADVOCATED AND ADVOCATE THAT
IRAN/IRAQ DISAGREEMENTS SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THOSE COUNTRIES
THEMSELVES AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ON THE BASIS OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS.
WE WILL WELCOME CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS, WHICH, AS WE HOPE, THE
SIDES WILL TAKE IN SEARCH OF A WAY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION
TO VEXED QUESTIONS".

2. FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM SHAH'S SPEECH IN REPLY.

"YOU HAVE MENTIONED RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.
I MERELY WISH TO NOTE THAT IF, IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH US,
IRAQ EMULATES THE POSITION TO, WHICH YOU, OUR GREAT
NEIGHBOUR, ADHERES IN RELATIONS WITH US, AND DOES NOT
ADHERE WITH SUCH BIAS TO THE LEGACY OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM,
THEN THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM BETWEEN US ON THIS QUESTION.
IN ANY CASE, IRAN WILL ALSO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS AIMED AT
A SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS".

GARVEY

FCO DISTRIBUTION

MED

MOD INTERNAL

(99)

CYFHER CAT A
GRPS 130
FM TEHRAN 111028Z

RESTRICTED
REGISTER No 35
12 DEC 1974
NBR 3/324/1

TOP COPY

RESTRICTED

1974

TO ROUTINE F C O TELNO 683 OF 11 DEC/ INFO BAGHDAD, AMMAN
AND MOSCOW.
IRAN/IRAQ

12/12/74

1. I ASKED THE IRANIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS RECENTLY
ABOUT THE DECISION OF THE ARAB LEAGUE TO TRY TO MEDIATE
BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

2. KHALATBARI SAID THAT ARAB ATTEMPTS HAD NOT GOT FAR.
THE IRAQIS APPEARED TO HAVE TURNED TO KING HUSSEIN RATHER
THAN PURSUING THE FOUR NATION CONCEPT AGREED UPON AT RABAT.
SO FAR ALL HUSSEIN HAD DONE WAS TO ASK THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR DIFFICULTIES WITH IRAQ.
KHALATBARI DID NOT EXPECT ANY RAPID OR SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS.
NOR HAD HE HEARD OF ANY ATTEMPT BY THE SOVIET UNION TO
MEDIATE.

3. HE SAID THAT THE FIGHTING WAS CONTINUING IN KURDESTAN.
BUT WINTER HAD COME AND BEFORE LONG THE FIGHTING WOULD SURELY
DIE DOWN. HE HAD HEARD THAT FOLLOWING RECENT BOMBING 15000
MORE REFUGEES WERE ABOUT TO ENTER IRAN.

PARSONS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
MED
NENAD
EESD
GIPD
NEWS D

pa 18
18/x11

RESTRICTED

SECRET. UK EYES ONLY.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

FO 578/E 03

LLC NR 174/17

ZZ MODUK

00 FCO

GR 200

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 17 DEC 1974 NBR 3/324/1

M.E.D.

Def D. (2)

MR. WEIR

MR. THOMSON

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 170655Z DEC

SECRET UK EYES "A"

TO FLASH MODUK TEL NO RTT/FOH 1538 OF 170650Z DEC
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO (ME DESK).

FLASH FOR DIS, IMMEDIATE FOR DI 4 AND GP CAPT TECH
INT (AIR) FROM BRITAIRAT.

1. STAPLETON BAC AREA MANAGER HERE HAS TOLD ME THAT
IIAF RAPIER FIRE UNIT FORWARD OF PIRANSHAH SHOT DOWN
ONE TU-16 (BADGER) AT APPROX 141200Z DEC. LOCATION
OF CRASH (IE WHICH SIDE OF BORDER) NOT YET KNOWN BY
US BUT IRANIANS HAVE RECOVERED SIX CREW. PILOT IS DEAD
BUT THEY HAVE NOT NOT CONFIRMED CONDITION OF REMAINDER
OF CREW. MOST PROBABLY ALL DEAD.

2. BAC SAY AIRCRAFT WAS AT EXTREME RANGE ABOUT 14
THOUSAND FEET. FIRST MISSILE FIRED WAS NEAR MISS
SECOND HIT THEN IN EXITEMENT OPERATOR FIRED A THIRD
INTO DEBRIS. WHEN HIT AIRCRAFT CAUGHT FIRE.

3. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFIED AS TU-16 OR TU-22 HAVE BEEN MAKING
REGULAR RUNS IN VICINITY OF FIRE UNITS FOR SOME DAYS

(Copy sent to...)
To Mr. Braden DS13
copied to Baghdad also. Mr. Barton
Mr. M. Williams
It was bound to
happen; and now
for the Iraqi back-
lash.

Y. 7/12

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 170655Z DEC

SECRET UK EYES "A"

TO FLASH MODUK TEL NO RTT/FOH 1538 OF 170650Z DEC
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO (ME DESK).

FLASH FOR DIS, IMMEDIATE FOR DI 4 AND GP CAPT TECH
INT (AIR) FROM BRITAIRAT.

1. STAPLETON BAC AREA MANAGER HERE HAS TOLD ME THAT
IIAF RAPIER FIRE UNIT FORWARD OF PIRANSHAH SHOT DOWN
ONE TU-16 (BADGER) AT APPROX 141200Z DEC. LOCATION
OF CRASH (IE WHICH SIDE OF BORDER) NOT YET KNOWN BY
US BUT IRANIANS HAVE RECOVERED SIX CREW. PILOT IS DEAD
BUT THEY HAVE NOT NOT CONFIRMED CONDITION OF REMAINDER
OF CREW. MOST PROBABLY ALL DEAD.

2. BAC SAY AIRCRAFT WAS AT EXTREME RANGE ABOUT 14
THOUSAND FEET. FIRST MISSILE FIRED WAS NEAR MISS
SECOND HIT THEN IN EXITEMENT OPERATOR FIRED A THIRD
INTO DEBRIS. WHEN HIT AIRCRAFT CAUGHT FIRE.

3. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFIED AS TU-16 OR TU-22 HAVE BEEN MAKING
REGULAR RUNS IN VICINITY OF FIRE UNITS FOR SOME DAYS
ALL AT ABOUT 14 TO 15 THOUSAND FEET. TWO PREVIOUS FIRINGS
FAILED BECAUSE AIRCRAFT WENT OUT OF RANGE. AIRCRAFT WERE
FLYING REGULAR PATTERNS AND MAY HAVE BEEN ON RECCO
RECCE MISSIONS.

4. WILL ADVISE ON POSSIBILITY OF BOOMERANG ACTION SOONEST.

PARSONS
BT

NNNNN

(Copy sent to...)
To Mr. Parsons DS13
copied to Baghdad also.
M. Barton
Mr. M. Williams
It was bound to happen; and now for the Iraqi back-lash.
Y. 17/12

102

CONFIDENTIAL


GR 190

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 171000Z DEC

CONFIDENTIAL



TOP COPY

Reply sent after

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 693 OF 17 DEC⁷⁴ / RPTD
FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE MODUK AND IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.
IRAN/IRAQ.

Discussion with
Group Capt Flood
Tech Int (Air)
A Boden. Fyale
DS 13. MOD.

1. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF MY AIRA ATTACHES TELE NO
RTT/FOH 1538 COULD BE REPEATED IMMEDIATE TO
BAGHDAD. 100

Tel. reptd. to BAGHDAD
DVB 17/11

2. I AM SEEING THE MINISTER OF COURT THIS
EVENING AND WILL SEEK HIS CO-OPERATION TO ENABLE US
TO SEND A TEAM TO EXAMINE THE WRECKAGE, IF WE SO WISH.

fu.

3. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY REPORTED
YESTERDAY THAT TWO IRAQI AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN
BY AMERICAN HAWK MISSILES. IF AND WHEN IT EMERGES THAT IT
WAS RAPIER WHICH DOWNED THE AIRCRAFT AND IF WE GET PRESS
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF BRITISH PERSONNEL,
WE PROPOSE TO ANSWER AS FOLLOWS. THERE ARE NO BRITISH
PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION OF RAPIER (IF
QUESTIONED FURTHER) YES, BAC CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ARE
STILL HELPING WITH MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THEIR CONTRACT. (ONLY IF QUESTIONED) THERE IS
NO QUESTION OF BRITISH CIVILIAN PERSONNEL EMPLOYED BY BAC
ENTERING IRAQI TERRITORY.

4. THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN NO PUBLICITY HERE FOR THE INCIDENT.

PARSONS

[SENT TO D C C]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
MED GIPD
NENAD NEWS D
DEF D MOD INTERNAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MED

MOD DISTRIBUTION

1343

LKS 600/17

PP MODUK

PP TEHRAN

GRS 75/2

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 171045Z DEC

RECEIVED IN
REGISTER N 35
18 DEC 1974
NBR 3/324/1

Mr. Butler

*V. odd that he did not
have guessed what they were.*

SECRET

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO 171045Z DEC AND TO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

DIG FOH

SHOOTING DOWN OF IRAQ A/C

MY FOH 171030Z REFERS.

AS WE HAVE SEEN NO REF TO DEPLOYMENT OF HAWK MISSILES IN
KURDISTAN BY IRAN WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF POSSIBILITY THAT THIS IS
A WRONG IDENTIFICATION BY IRAQ OF MISSILES USED.

GRAHAM

BT

GRS 195

IMMEDIATE

CYMER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 180630Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 181130Z

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY N 35 18 DEC 1974 NBR 3/324/1
--

(103)

TOP COPY
Given Mod. internal
distribution.
DVB/XII

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 483 OF 18 DECEMBER 1974, INFO
IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, ANE PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

TEHRAN TEL NO 693 TO YOU (NOT TO ALL) : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. FOR THE RECORD M.I.F.T. CONTAINS THE TEXTS, IN
TRANSLATION, OF THE IRAQI MILITARY COMMUNIQUE ISSUED
ON 16 DECEMBER AND OF A STATEMENT BY THE IRAQI MFA
ISSUED YESTERDAY.
2. IT IS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT IN DESCRIBING THE
INCIDENT OF 15 DECEMBER, THE COMMUNIQUE CLAIMS THAT THE
AIRCRAFT WAS BROUGHT DOWN INSIDE IRAQI TERRITORY, WHEREAS
THOUGH THE POINT IS BLURRED, NO SUCH SPECIFIC CLAIM IS
MADE FOR THE INCIDENT OF 14 DECEMBER.
3. IN COMPANY WITH OTHER HEADS OF MISSION,
I HAVE BEEN INVITED BY THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MFA TO A
MEETING AT NOON.
4. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF TEHRAN T.U.R.,
I PROPOSE TO SAY IF PRESSED ON THE USE OF RAPIER, THAT IT
IS OUR PRACTISE TO SUPPLY ARMAMENTS TO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES
FOR THEIR DEFENCE - IN DEED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ARE
ALWAYS PRESSING US TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING - BUT THAT WE ARE
IN NO WAY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE USE THEY MAKE OF THEM.
I WOULD ADD THAT HMG DEPLORE ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY WHOEVER
COMMITTED.

GRAHAM

BT

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
MED
NENAD
DEFENCE DEPT
GIPD
NEWS DEPT
MOD INTERNAL

Reply sent
pa.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 350
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM TEHRAN 180730Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 19 DEC 1974	RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 19 DEC 1974 NBR 3/324/1
---	--

TOP COPY
Pa

CONFIDENTIAL

1974

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 695 OF 18 DEC/ INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.
MY TELEGRAM NO 693: IRAN/IRAQ

102

1. WHEN I SAW ALAM ON 17 DECEMBER, HE WAS JUBILANT. HE EXPRESSED DELIGHT AT THE PERFORMANCE OF RAPIER AND OF ITS IRANIAN OPERATORS. HE MAINTAINED THAT RAPIER HAD IN FACT DOWNED TWO AIRCRAFT (AS REPORTED IN TODAY'S IRANIAN PRESS).
2. I TOLD ALAM THAT I THOUGHT THAT OUR TECHNICAL PEOPLE WOULD BE VERY KEEN TO HAVE A LOOK AT ANY WRECKAGE WHICH MIGHT BE ACCESSIBLE. ALAM SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT THIS. IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT OUR PEOPLE SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXAMINE THE WRECKAGE. HE WOULD SPEAK TO THE SHAH TODAY.
3. AS REGARDS THE ACTUAL FIGHTING IN KURDISTAN, ALAM SAID THAT THE KURDS WERE NOW IN BETTER SHAPE - THE DOWNING OF THE IRAQI AIRCRAFT WOULD GIVE THEIR MORALE A FURTHER LIFT. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD SURVIVE THE WINTER. HE ADDED THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT COULD GIVE MUCH MORE HELP AND ENABLE THE KURDS TO PUSH THE IRAQIS BACK. BUT THEY WOULD NOT DO SO. THE SHAH DID NOT WANT TO INVOLVE IRAN IN WHAT WOULD AMOUNT TO OPEN WAR WITH IRAQ. THEIR INTENTION WAS TO CONTINUE TO KEEP THE KURDS AFLOAT AND TO HELP THEM TO FORTIFY THEIR POSITIONS DURING THE WINTER SO THAT THEY COULD WITHSTAND A FRESH IRAQI OFFENSIVE NEXT SPRING. WHAT THE KURDS NEEDED WAS MORE LONG RANGE ARTILLERY. AS I KNEW, IRAN HAD ALREADY PROVIDED SOME, AS THE ECONOMIST HAD IRRESPONSIBLY POINTED OUT THIS WEEK, AND IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO TAKE OUT THE IRANIAN GUN POSITIONS FROM THE AIR HAD BEEN PATHETICALLY INEFFECTIVE.

PARSONS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NENAD
MED
DEFENCE D
GIPD
NEWS D
MOD INTERNAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(105)

GRS 100/2

EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 171045Z DEC

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP COPY

RECEIVED
RECEIVED
15 DEC 1974
NBR 3/324/1

Mr Williams
&
Mr. Burton have seen
Pa.

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 482 OF 17 DECEMBER⁷⁴ INFO ROUTINE TEHRAN.

1. COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY GENERAL STAFF OF IRAQI ARMED FORCES REPORTING SHOOTING DOWN OF TWO IRAQI AIRCRAFT IS GIVEN MUCH PROMINENCE IN TODAY'S NEWSPAPERS. TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE WILL BE AVAILABLE TO YOU. THE SHARP WARNING TO IRAN IS NOTEWORTHY. THE PRESS ALSO REPORTS THAT THE "OCCUPATIONAL AND POPULAR ORGANISATIONS AS WELL AS THE BROAD MASSES OF THE PEOPLE" HAVE "VEHEMENTLY LASHED OUT AT THE RECURRING ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY THE RULING IRANIAN REACTIONARIES". THESE REFER TO TELEGRAMS FROM LOCAL ABSP ORGANISATIONS AND VILLAGE COUNCILS TO THE PRESIDENCY.

GRAHAM

DEPARTMENTAL DISTR

MED

NENAD

DEFENCE

GIPD

NEWS

MOD INTERNAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

GR 85

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 171715Z

NBR3/324/1

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TELNO 537 OF 17 DECEMBER 74 INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

101
YOUR TELNO 693 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. PARA 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. WE WOULD WISH TO BE INVOLVED AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, IF THE AIRCRAFT IS REASONABLY INTACT AND IN IRAN, WE WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEND AN EXPERT, NOT A TEAM, TO EXAMINE IT.
2. WE AGREE THE PRESS LINE YOU PROPOSE AND WILL SPEAK SIMILARLY IF THIS PROVES NECESSARY. REPORTS HERE HAVE BEEN CONFINED TO THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY STORY REFERRING TO US HAWK MISSILES.

CALLAGHAN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
MED
NENAD
NEWS D
DEF D

COPIES TO
GP CAPT FLOOD
TECH INT (ER) MOD
H BRADEN DS13 MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

pa 18
18/x11

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 500

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 181110Z DEC.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

REC-10
REC-10
19 DEC 1974
NBR 3/324/1

TOP COPY

Page 12

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 488 OF 18 DECEMBER 1974, INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN AND PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UK MIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 483 ¹⁰³ : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. THE MEETING REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 WAS ATTENDED BY ALL HEADS OF MISSION IN BAGHDAD WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE IRANIAN, AND TOOK PLACE BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TEL NO 348. THE UNDER-SECRETARY (HADITHI) GAVE US EACH A NOTE (TEXT BY BAG, NOT TO ALL) AND SPOKE TO IT. HIS BURDEN WAS THAT IRAQ HAD BEEN PATIENT AND DESIRED NOTHING MORE THAN TO SETTLE ITS QUARRELS WITH IRAN IN A SPIRIT OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS. BUT THE LATEST ESCALATION CREATED A "CRISIS SITUATION WITH OUR NEIGHBOUR IRAN" WHICH POSED A MENACE TO SECURITY NOT ONLY IN THE AREA BUT IN THE ENTIRE WORLD. EVEN IF THE IRANIAN CLAIM THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD VIOLATED IRANIAN AIRSPACE WERE TRUE, IT WAS NOT THE ACT OF A GOOD NEIGHBOUR TO SHOOT THEM DOWN. BUT IN FACT IT WAS NOT TRUE. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WERE KEEN TO HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH IRAN WITH WHOM THEY HAD HISTORICAL, RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL TIES, BUT SO FAR THEY HAD MET WITH NO RESPONSE. ON THE CONTRARY THE MORE CONCESSIONS IRAQ MADE TO "THEIR KURDISH BRETHREN," THE MORE IRAN STEPPED UP HER SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS, EVEN THOUGH THE KURDS IN IRAN ENJOYED NONE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THOSE IN IRAQ. THE INTENTION OF IRAN AND OF HER U.S. BACKERS IN ALL THIS WAS CLEAR. IRAQ WOULD DEFEND ITS RIGHTS, SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. THE UNDER-SECRETARY ASKED THE HEADS OF MISSION TO CONVEY THIS STATEMENT OF IRAQ'S POSITION TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

2. THERE WERE NO COMMENTS BUT AS WE LEFT I ASKED THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT WHETHER IRAQ WOULD BE RAISING THE MATTER WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID THEY WOULD BE NOTIFYING THE COUNCIL BUT NOT REQUESTING A MEETING.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. IN AN EARLIER CALL THIS MORNING ON THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION, THE LATER TOLD ME THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT THE AMERICANS HAD DENIED THAT ANY HAWK MISSILES HAD YET BEEN SUPPLIED TO IRAN AND HAD SAID THAT THE WEAPONS USED MUST HAVE BEEN BRITISH. WITHOUT CONFIRMING OR DENYING THIS, I SAID THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT AT A TIME BEFORE THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS IN CONTEMPLATION, WE HAD SUPPLIED IRAN WITH MISSILES, BUT WE WERE IN NO WAY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR USE. THE MINISTER SAID THAT HE OF COURSE UNDERSTOOD THAT.


4. ALL THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE IRAQIS INTEND TO PLAY THE AFFAIR COOLLY, THOUGH IN THE LONG RUN, AS THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION PUT IT TO ME, IT WILL GO ON THE ACCOUNT FOR SETTLEMENT.

GRAHAM

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

MED
NENAD
DEFENCE DEPT
GIPD
NEWS DEPT
UND
N AM DEPT
MOD INTERNAL

OPS 195
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM TEHRAN 181240Z DEC 1974



Spoken to Capt Flood who
tells me that the remains
will probably be brought
to Iran by the IIRAF for
examination. Also spoken
with DSN.
pa
PS

SECRET
DESKBY 181600Z DEC 1974

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL NO RTT/FOH OF 181240Z DEC 1974
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO (ME DESK).

DESKBY 181600Z

FOR DIA AND GP CAPT TECH INT AIR FROM BRITAIRAT.

YOUR FOH 171125Z DEC.

1. YOU WILL BY NOW HAVE SEEN ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS
FROM SECRET SOURCES. THESE ARE:

- A. ALL CREW MEMBERS RECOVERED (SIX) WERE IRAQI.
- B. BEST POSITION OF TU-16 BADGER CRASH WE HAVE IS
NEAR VILLAGE JUST EAST OF CHOUMAN (3640N 4444E).
THIS IS KURDISH HELD TERRITORY BUT OUTSIDE IRAN.
- C. REGRET STILL UNCERTAIN OF EXACT LOCATION OF FIRE UNITS.

2. YOU WILL ALSO HAVE SEEN THAT IRANIANS NOW CLAIM TWO
AIRCRAFT DESTROYED TU-16 AND SU-7. LATTER SAID TO HAVE
CRASHED IN RUWANDUZ AREA AND BELIEVED TO BE IN IRAQI HANDS.
BAC HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF SECOND SUCCESS BUT THEY COULD
WELL NOT BE FULLY INFORMED DESPITE PRESENCE OF THEIR TEAM
AT PIRANSHAH.

3. REFERENCE OPERATION BOOMERANG. PLEASE SEE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 537 OF 171715Z. I HAVE ARRANGED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL KHATEMI ON SATURDAY 0830 LOCAL. GRATEFUL FOR
INSTRUCTIONS (IMMEDIATE DESKBY) AS TO WHAT I SHOULD SAY TO
HIM.

PARSONS
FILES

[SENT TO DCC]

ME D
DEFENCE D
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

GRS 80
FLASH
CYPHER CAT.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 DEC 1974
NBR 3/324/1

FM F C O 181052Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO F L A S H BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 348 OF 18/12/74
INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

¹⁰³
YOUR TEL NO 483: IRAN/IRAQ
WE AGREE THE LINE IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 4 OF
TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN HOWEVER
FROM TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO RTT/FOH1538 (NOT TO ALL) THAT IT
IS NOT CLEAR ON WHICH SIDE OF THE BORDER THE AIRCRAFT IS.
YOU MIGHT THEREFORE FORBEAR USING THE LAST SENTENCE OF
YOUR PARA 4.

CALLAGHAN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
NENAD
NEWS DEPT
UND
NAD
MOD INTERNAL

para 1/xii

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 700

IMMEDIATE

EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 180645Z DEC.

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO 35
19 DEC 1974
NBR 3/324/1

fa 19
12 XII

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 484 OF 18 DECEMBER 1974. INFO
PRIORITY TEHRAN AND ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED BY GENERAL STAFF
OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES ON 16 DECEMBER :

"AT ABOUT FIVE O'CLOCK ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON, DECEMBER 14,
WHILE OUR PLANES WERE CARRYING OUT THEIR DUTIES IN THE
NORTHERN AREA INSIDE IRAQI TERRITORY, ONE OF THEM, FLYING
AT A HIGH ALTITUDE, WAS DESTROYED WITH A GROUND-TO-AIR
HAWK MISSILE OF AMERICAN MAKE AND WITH WHICH THE IRANIAN
FORCES ARE EQUIPPED.

"AT ABOUT FOUR O'CLOCK ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON, DECEMBER 15, THE
ACT WAS REPEATED AND ONE MORE OF OUR PLANES WAS HIT AND
BROUGHT DOWN WITH A HAWK MISSILE IN THE SAME AREA, AGAIN
WITHIN IRAQI TERRITORY.

"THE IRANIAN ENCROACHMENT, ACTS OF INTERVENTION AND ACTS
OF AGGRESSION, BACKED BY AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, HAVE NOW ENTERED
UPON A DANGEROUS STAGE. IRAN AND THOSE WHO STAND BEHIND
IT SHALL BEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTS."

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED BY MFA ON 17 DECEMBER.

QUOTE.

THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS, ON FREQUENT OCCASIONS,
LAID BARE THE ACTS OF AGGRESSION PERPETRATED BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF IRAN AGAINST IRAQ AS WELL AS THE INCESSANT EFFORTS TO
JEOPARDISE IRAQ'S FULL TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY EVER SINCE THE
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TOOK THE STEP OF UNILATERALLY ABROGATING
THE 1937 SHATT-AL-ARAB AGREEMENT. IT HAS BEEN NOTICED THAT
ACTS OF AGGRESSION ON IRAQ'S BORDERS HAVE BEEN INCREASING AND
EXPANDING IN SCOPE, EACH TIME THE EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
MET WITH NEW SUCCESSES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SELF-RULE
/LAW IN THE

LAW IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY AND THE FINAL ANNIHILATION OF THE HIRELING OUTLAW FACTION. ON ALL THOSE OCCASIONS, THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE INTERFERENCE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN IN IRAQ'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND THE ACTS OF AGGRESSION ON IRAQ'S BORDERS CONSTITUTED IN REALITY AN ACT OF INTERVENTION AND OF AGGRESSION BY THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISM. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS IS, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, PART OF THE TOTALITY OF THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT IN THE REGION BY THE UNITED STATE OF AMERICA WITH THE PURPOSE OF SERVING THE OBJECTIVES OF ITS NOTORIOUS POLICY OF AGGRESSION.

'NOW, THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS HAS ENTERED A NEW STAGE WITH THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WHICH LED TO THE INCIDENTS REFERRED TO IN THE STATEMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES ON DECEMBER 16, 1974.

'THE OCCURRENCE OF THESE INCIDENTS HAS SHIFTED INTERVENTION IN IRAQ'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND THE ARMED AGGRESSION ON IRAQ'S TERRITORIES, POPULATION AND ARMED FORCES, TO A NEW LEVEL WHICH CANNOT BE PASSED IN SILENCE.

'INTERVENTION BY IRAN IN IRAQ'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF THE UNITED STATE OF AMERICA, CONSTITUTES A FULL-FLEDGED BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OF THE UN CHARTER, AS WELL AS AN ACT OF TOTAL DISREGARD FOR THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BASED ON RESPECT TO SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF STATES AND NON-INTERVENTION IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. A STATE OF AFFAIRS SUCH AS THIS ONE CAN ONLY LEAD TO TURBULENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TO JEOPARDISING PEACE AND TO CREATING THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONDUCTIVE TO ARMED CONFLICTS.

'THE SITUATION ARISING FROM THE ABOVE MENTIONED INTERVENTION WITH ITS NEW LEVEL CANNOT BUT BE DESCRIBED AS SERIOUS AND WARRANTING STEPS TO BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

'THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ, WHICH HAS CONSTANTLY WORKED TO SOLVE ITS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, MUST MAKE IT CLEAR TO ALL QUARTERS CONCERNED THAT THE NEW SITUATION JUST CANNOT BE GLOSSED OVER AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL ASSUME A FIRM STAND FOR PROTECTING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND REPELLING THE AGGRESSION DIRECTED AGAINST THE COUNTRY. IN ANNOUNCING THIS, THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ ADDRESSES ITSELF TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENTS OF THE ARAB HOMELAND TO

/STATE THAT THE

STATE THAT THE PERPETRATIONS OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, IN CONNIVANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ARE PART AND PARCEL OF THE TOTALLITY OF THE HOSTILE ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY IMPERIALISM IN THE ARAB REGION - SOMETHING WHICH WARRANTS BOTH CONCERN AND CAUTION.

''AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ EXHORTS THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY TO KEEP AN EYE ON THIS STRAINED AND GRAVE SITUATION AND REMINDS ALL OF THE COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY CONCERNING THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD. IT IS THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THOSE STANDING BEHIND IT WHO, IN THE END, WILL BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES ARISING FROM THIS DANGEROUS STATE OF AFFAIRS.''

UNQUOTE.

GRAHAM

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

MED
NENAD
DEFENCE D
GIPD
NEWS D
MOD INTERNAL


NO DISTRIBUTION

(LIT)

Mr PK Williams MED

Regy: NB
pu ~~SVB~~ 19/XII

PP BAGHDAD
RR TEHRAN



GRS 50A

CYPHER CAT A

FM MODUK 181545Z DECEMBER
TO PRIORITY BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO BRITAIRAT TEHRAN
FCO (ATTN PK WILLIAMS)

SECRET UK EYES ALPHA

DIG RTT

¹⁰⁰
D14 EXCLUSIVE FOR DEFENCE ATTACHE SUBJECT BRITAIRAT TEHRAN'S
RTT/FOH 1538 AS INDICATED BY MY RTT 181210Z DEC (NOT TEHRAN).
BECAUSE OF SENSITIVITY OF SUBJECT WE ARE TREATING IT AS UK
EYES ONLY FOR TIME BEING.


BT

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

112

GRS 250
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A



FM BAGHDAD 190900Z DEC.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 490 OF 19 DECEMBER 1974,
INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

¹⁰⁴
TEHRAN TEL NO 695 TO YOU : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I CAN UNDERSTAND, AND IN A SENSE, SHARE THE SATISFACTION THAT RAPIER HAS PROVED ITSELF OPERATIONALLY. BUT ALAM'S ATTITUDE, REFLECTING I ASSUME THAT OF THE SHAH, STRIKES ME AS DANGEROUSLY IRRESPONSIBLE. WHAT IS THE SHAH'S LONG-TERM AIM ? EVEN HE APPARENTLY DOES NOT EXPECT OR DESIRE A REAL KURDISH VICTORY AND IT IS ONLY AN IRAQI MILITARY DEFEAT THAT IS LIKELY TO PUT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN JEOPARDY (LEADING TO ANOTHER AUTHORITARIAN REGIME OF A MORE OR LESS 'REVOLUTIONARY' FLAVOUR). SHORT OF THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE THE DETERMINATION AND CAPACITY TO CARRY THIS THROUGH TILL THE REBELLION IS CRUSHED. THE SHAH'S POLICY SEEMS CALCULATED TO ENSURE THAT THE PROCESS IS AS SLOW AND BLOODY AS POSSIBLE AND THAT THE MAXIMUM RESENTMENT IS CREATED IN IRAQ.

2. THIS WOULD PERHAPS NOT MATTER TO HMG WERE IT NOT FOR THE FACT THAT IRAQI RESENTMENT IS LIKELY TO BE VENTED, NOT DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY ON IRAN, WHICH THEY PROBABLY JUDGE STILL TOO MUCH FOR THEM, BUT ON IRAN'S AND OUR FRIENDS IN THE LOWER GULF. AS I HAVE REPORTED THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS OF A SOFTENING OF THE IRAQI LINE IN THOSE AREAS, BUT I CANNOT SEE THIS TREND CONTINUING IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING AND GROWING IRANIAN INTERFERENCE IN KURDISTAN.

GRAHAM

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
MED
NENAD
DEFENCE D
GIPD
NEWS D
MOD INTERNAL

CONFIDENTIAL

113

*Mr Williams Dec 20
1974*

PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
GPS 200
FM BAGHDAD 190945Z DEC.

CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY N-35
19 DEC 1974
NBR 3/324/1

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 492 OF 19 DECEMBER 1974, INFO
PRIORITY TEHRAN, WASHINGTON AND UK MIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 488 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. THE PRESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAN IS MAINTAINED TO-DAY
WITH LEADING ARTICLES AND REPORTS OF MEETINGS UP AND DOWN THE
COUNTRY AND OF TELEGRAMS TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND TO
OTHER BODIES SUCH AS THE ICFTU. THE PREDOMINANT THEMES
ARE THE LINKING OF IRANIAN ACTIVITIES
TO ZIONISM, AND THE EXPLICIT ALLEGATION THAT THE U.S. GOVT
IS BEHIND IRAN.

2. THE HEAD OF THE U.S. INTERESTS SECTION (PLEASE PROTECT)
HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TELL THE IRAQI MFA THAT THE MISSILE
USED WAS NOT HAWK, A FACT OF WHICH THE IRAQIS ARE PROBABLY
ALREADY AWARE (CF PARA 3 OF MY T U R). THE CONTINUED
INSISTENCE ON THE ALLEGED U.S. ROLE IS INTERESTING IN THIS
CONTEXT. I DOUBT IF IT IS OUT OF ANY WISH TO SPARE US : THE
U.S. IS CERTAINLY THE NO 1 TARGET OF IRAQI WRATH, AFTER ISRAEL,
AND IT MAY WELL SUIT THEM TO LEAVE IT THAT WAY. THEY MAY
ALSO NOT WANT TO ADMIT THEIR FAULTY IDENTIFICATION. IT IS
HOWEVER TOO EARLY TO ASSUME THAT WE ARE OUT OF THE WOOD,
THOUGH THE MINISTER OF INFORMATIONS RESPONSE TO ME WAS
HOPEFUL.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
MED
NENAD
DEFENCE D
GIPD
NEWS D
UND
N AM D
MOD INTERNAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 98
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TEHRAN 191000Z DEC 1974

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 20 DEC 1974 NR 3/329/1 1974
--

Handwritten:
COPY
20/12
20/12
20/12

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 701 OF 19 DEC, RPTD FOR INFO
TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD.

MY TEL NO 695 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. ALAM TELEPHONED THIS MORNING TO INDICATE OBLIQUELY
THAT, SINCE THE AIRCRAFT HAD FALLEN ON IRAQI TERRITORY
THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF THE IRANIANS ASKING US TO
SEND BRITISH EXPERTS TO THE SCENE OF THE CRASH. I SAID
THIS WAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD.

2. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE TAKING STEPS TO LIASE WITH THE
IRANIANS OVER ACCESS TO ANY EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
VALUE WHICH THEY MAY RECOVER TO IRAN FROM THE WRECKAGE.
COMMUNICATIONS ON THIS WILL BE PURSUED THROUGH APPROPRIATE
CHANNELS. MY AIR ATTACHE WILL IN ANY EVENT TELEGRAPH FURTHER
WHEN HE HAS SEEN GENERAL KHATEMI ON SATURDAY.

PARSONS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

MED

NENAD

DEFENCE D

SIPD

NEWS D

MOD INTERNAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 600

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT 'A

FM BAGHDAD 191430Z DEC. 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 20 DEC 1974 NBR 3/324/1

COPY TOP COPY
112
10/12
pa

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 493 OF 19 DECEMBER 1974, INFO
PRIORITY TEHRAN AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 492 ¹¹³ : IRAN/IRAQ - KURDISTAN.

1. I WAS CALLED TO SEE THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS AFTERNOON. THE MINISTER RAISED, NOT RAPIER BUT A REPORT HE HAD RECEIVED THAT A BRITISH MEDICAL MISSION WAS SETTING OUT FOR KURDISTAN. HE SAID THAT IN IRAQI EYES BRITAIN HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR A NUMBER OF UNFRIENDLY ACTS AGAINST THE ARABS IN GENERAL AND IRAQ IN PARTICULAR, FROM THE BALFOUR DECLARATION ON (HE INSTANCED 'BAD HANDLING' OF IRAQI CITIZENS IN BRITAIN, PRESUMABLY THE PROSECUTIONS FOR SHOP-LIFTING, AND OUR ALLIANCE WITH IRAN). I INTERJECTED THAT IF WE WERE GOING TO TRADE PAST UNFRIENDLY ACTS I COULD SUPPLY A LIST OF MY OWN, BUT I WAS WORKING IN THE BASIS DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT, THAT WE HAD OPENED A NEW PAGE.

2. HAMMADI CONTINUED THAT IN THE LAST YEAR OR SO IRAQ HAD MADE A REAL EFFORT TO CREATE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN THE WEST, INCLUDING BRITAIN. HOWEVER FOR IRAQ KURDISTAN WAS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER AND THEY WOULD TOLERATE NO INTERFERENCE OR SUPPORT FOR THE KURDS. SOME MIGHT ARGUE THAT A MEDICAL MISSION CONSTITUTED ONLY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, BUT FOR IRAQ IT WAS HELP FOR THE ENEMY. ACCORDINGLY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WISHED GPPKDNER A VERY STRONG PROTEST AT THIS BRITISH ACT.

3. I SAID THAT I WAS CONVINCED THAT, IF THIS REPORT WERE TRUE, IT COULD NOT RELATE TO ANY SORT OF OFFICIAL MISSION. THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PRIVATE MISSION WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE AND IF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT CHOSE TO REGARD THAT AS A MATTER OF PROTEST IT WAS THEIR RIGHT. BUT TO HOLD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF THIS NATURE

WAS TO ASK US TO OVERTURN OUR WHOLE SYSTEM AND AMOUNTED IN TURN TO INTERFERENCE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AND I PERSONALLY, WERE SINCERELY WORKING TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS ON THE BASIS THAT THE PAST WAS THE PAST BUT AS I KNEW FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AT THE TIME OF THE BIAFRAN WAR, WE WERE POWERLESS TO CONTROL PRIVATE INITIATIVES OF THIS KIND.

4. HAMMADI REPEATED THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVERTHELESS HOLD HMG RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY SUPPORT TO THE KURDS, "HOWEVER INDIRECT," AND THAT THEY WISHED TO PROTEST STRONGLY AT THIS REPORTED MISSION. I UNDERSTOOD TO REPORT AND TO CONVEY ANY COMMENTS.

5. THE MINISTER SPOKE THROUGHOUT IN VERY LOW KEY, AS IS HIS NATURE, BUT THE INTERVIEW WAS FAIRLY CHILLY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO FORECAST HOW BADLY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WILL IN FACT TAKE A MISSION OF THIS KIND. MY GUESS WOULD BE THAT THEY WOULD LEAVE IT AT A PROTEST WHILE MAKING THINGS MORE DIFFICULT FOR US E.G. ON THE VISA AND PERHAPS COMMERCIAL FRONTS.

6. SINCE DRAFTING THE ABOVE I HAVE SEEN TEHRAN TEL NO 700 (NOT TO ALL) WHICH HAS JUST BEEN RECEIVED. I MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN A STRONGER POSITION IN TALKING TO THE MINISTER HAD I RECEIVED THE REFERENCE. I TRUST THAT IF PRESSED (PARA 4 TEHRAN TEL UNDER REF) WE CAN CONFINE OURSELVES TO SAYING THAT IT IS NOT A MATTER FOR HMG TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE; THE ORGANISERS ARE FREE AGENTS.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

GRAHAM. [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

MED

NEW AD

DEFENCE D

GIP D

NEWS D

UND

NAM D

MOD INTERNAL

FO 391/E11/21

LLC NR 263/21

NO DISTRIBUTION
MES

PP MODUK

GR 100

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 210730Z DEC

SECRET - UK EYES ALPHA

TO PRIORITY MODUK TEL NO DIG RTT/FOH OF 210730Z DEC.

FOR DIS DUTY OFFICER FROM BRITAIRAT AND INFO DIA AND
GP CAPT TECH INT.

OPERATION BOOMERANG.

TU-16 SHOT DOWN IN IRAQ NEAR IRAQ/IRAN BORDER.


IN ABSENCE OF REPLY TO MY PREVIOUS SIGNAL SAW GENERAL
KHATEI THIS MORNING. HE IS WILLING TO LET US
EXAMINE ELECTRONIC AND ANY OTHER COMPONENTS RECOVERED
FROM WRECK. HE BELIEVED AIRCRAFT CARRIED IFF AND NAV/COM
EQUIPMENT ONLY. HE SHOWED ME PHOTOGRAPHS OF CRASH AND BODIES
OF CREW AND CONFIRMED ALL SIX WERE IRAQIS. PLEASE INFORM ME
SOONEST IF AND WHEN YOU WILL SEND EXPERT OR TEAM TO EXAMINE
RECOVERED EQUIPMENT.

CCN GENERAL KA KHATEMI...

PARSONS

BT

Sent Dec.



M. B. 12/12

M. 12/12

0910

116



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

117

David (ME)

31/12/74
12/12/74

His Excellency
Mr J A N Graham CMG
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

Date 24 December 1974

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

31 DEC 1974

NBR 3/324/1

Dear Johnny,

IRAQ/IRAN RELATIONS

1. Hamandi, the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, called on me on 24 December at his request. It turned out that his object was to deliver a copy of the statement issued recently by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the situation on the frontier with Iran. I enclose a copy of the statement, which we had in fact already received from the Iraqi Embassy under cover of a Note on 20 December. The same statement was also published in "The Times" of 24 December. Hamandi who seemed rather embarrassed explained that he wanted to make sure that we had seen the statement as his Government were very disturbed by the aggressive attitude of Iran and the dangers of disturbing the peace of the area. I said that it was a matter for regret that relations between two neighbouring countries should have deteriorated in this way and asked whether there were any prospects of a resumption of the talks on a frontier settlement which had begun in Istanbul a few months ago. Hamandi then appeared out of his depth and said that he was not briefed on the subject.
2. He went on to talk about the arrival of the new Ambassador and will be advising him to come here early in January. It would be convenient from our point of view if he were here ready to begin the official round in the week beginning 6 January.
3. Hamandi expressed regret at the number of articles appearing in the British press critical of Iraq. He realised that the British press was entirely free to print what it wanted but it was none the less unfortunate that they did not print the true facts of the situation in Iraq. I drew his attention to the excellent article on Iraq in last week's "Economist". I also suggested that the Iraqi Government should consider inviting more journalists to visit Iraq.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL



4. As we had at last got the agreement of all Departments to the issue of an export licence for Cymbeline that morning I took the opportunity of informing him of the decision. He was uninformed on Cymbeline but undertook nevertheless to convey the information to his Government.

5. I also raised the question of the draft Memorandum of Understanding but Hamandi was unaware of its existence. He asked whether we wanted him to pursue the matter with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I said that as he had not been involved so far, it was probably better to leave it between you and the Ministry.

6. Throughout the long interview Hamandi was extremely affable and at no time gave any hint of concern over any of the contentious issues which have been raised with you in recent weeks.

Yours ever,
T J Clark

T J Clark
Middle East Department

cc: Chancery TEHRAN

CONFIDENTIAL

Unofficial Translation .

Republic of Iraq

Ministry for foreign Affairs

No.: Frontiers /1/5/13/

- Political Department -

Date : 17 December 1974

The ministry for Foreign Affairs of the republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Missions accredited in Iraq and has the honour to inform them that the office of the Chief of General Staff issued yesterday a statement about the shooting down of two Iraqi planes while flying at a high altitude within Iraqi air space in the northern area of the country by U. S. - made Hawk rockets supplied to and used by the Iranian armed forces on the 14th and 15th of December 1974 .

The esteemed Diplomatic Missions were previously informed on various occasions of some aspects of the recurrent Iranian acts of aggression , the latest of which was the shelling of (Qala daza) area with heavy artillery of 175 mms. and 203 mms. calibre on the 29th, 30th and 31st October 1974 which are also U.S. - made weapons supplied to and used by the Iranian armed forces .

Proving the source of such rockets and missiles hardly requires any evidence this is because such heavy weapons and ammunition can be possessed and employed only by states having regular forces and massive financing , since it is impossible for a group of rebels dispersed on the remotest frontier of the country to be in possession of weapons of such magnitude and modernity .

Ever since its unilateral abrogation of the Boundary Treaty of 1937 between the two countries , Iran has resorted

to acts of infringement , violation and encroachment against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq whether on its eastern frontier or its national waters backed by the United States of America in the interests of imperialism in the area , interfering thereby in the internal affairs of Iraq on various pretexts , ignoring every international custom and violating the United Nations Charter , the principles of international law and the provisions of the Treaty of 1937 . While doing all this , Iran is fully aware of the fact that it is committing aggression against an independent neighbour state and a founding member of the United Nations .

The ministry would like to bring to the attention of the international community through the esteemed Diplomatic Corps the grave consequences ensuing from the encroachments and acts of aggression by Iran against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic of Iraq . Such grave consequences threaten peace and security in the area .

The Ministry would also like to express the resolve and determination of the government of the republic of Iraq to safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the homeland and to preserve its full rights . Thus it holds the Iranian government and those who stand behind it responsible for all the consequences and results ensuing from the encroachments and acts of aggression it commits. While requesting the communication of the foregoing to their respective governments , the ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the diplomatic missions the assurances of its highest consideration .



1/2

M S Weir Esq CMG
Assistant Under-Secretary of State
F C O

My dear Michael,

IRAQ/IRAN - KURDISTAN

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
-8 JAN 1975

NBR 3/324/1

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

Li' Baylon.

22 December 1974

Regy: submit with Baghdad
No 493. We have
already spoken to the
BBC and will need to
follow this up.

Li' Bruckmeyer is writing to
the BBC again.

1. I had the Iraqi Ambassador designate to London, Abdul Malik Al Yasin, to dinner the other night and with him the Director-General of the Protocol Department and the Acting Director-General of the Political Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ibrahim Al Wali.

2. Neither knew of the protest delivered that afternoon and reported in my telegram No 493 of 19 December. Al Wali said that he had heard on the BBC Arabic Service, which had made quite a thing of it, of the despatch of the medical mission and that he had been asked to see me officially. He had put it off on the grounds that not only was he seeing me that night at dinner but that the despatch of a medical mission from Britain was not really an appropriate subject for an approach. I emphasised as strongly as I could, both to him and to Al Yasin that this was a private mission, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that HMG had no power to control it: if the Iraq Government wanted to pick a quarrel over it then we would just have to quarrel. For my part I would regret that, more especially since I did not believe that a medical mission would in any way affect the Iraq Government's campaign against the Kurds. Both men seemed to accept these arguments but Al Yasin repeated that "they" took the Kurdish situation very seriously - I interjected that we did too - and were inclined to take the line that anyone who was not for them was against them.

Yours ever
JAN

J A N Graham

Copied to:
HE Mr & D Parsons CMG MVO MC

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

120



3/17

M S Weir Esq CMG
Assistant Under-Secretary of State
F C O



BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

18 December 1974

My dear Michael,

LAST PAPER

M. Williams 8/1
M. Butler 11/1
M. Young - para 3
4/1 *7/1*

IRAQ/IRAN

1. I called on 18 December on the new Minister of Information, Tariq Aziz. I had met him when he gave a lunch for Harold Beeley but this was my first call on him in his office. He had said he wanted to talk about the British press and the Kurdish question and I, for my part, wanted to raise the future of the British School of Archaeology, about which I am writing separately.
2. In the event, the meeting, which was fixed some time ago, followed the shooting down of the two Iraqi aircraft and the conversation largely took the form of a discussion of Iraq's problems with Iran. Tariq Aziz said that the present Iraqi Government had come to power expecting to be faced with problems. They were a young and revolutionary regime and problems were meat and drink to them (I paraphrase). In fact they had not met as many as they had expected but those, such as the Kurdish question, with which they were grappling, they would deal with whether it took 2, 3, 4 or 5 years. The Shah's policy in Kurdistan and towards Iraq was very short sighted. If Iraq and Iran could reach an understanding quickly, the Kurdish problem would soon be resolved and Iraq and Iran could settle down as good neighbours. If, however, the Iraqis had to settle the problem by themselves, as they would, the Shah could not expect the Iraq Government to be well disposed towards him thereafter. Moreover Iraq was indisputably an Arab country in which the Kurds formed only some 20%: Iran, on the other hand, was not predominantly Persian, since counting the Kurds, Baluchis and Arabs, the Persians amounted only to some 40% of the population. I asked Tariq Aziz at this point whether the Shah's policy might not perhaps be dictated by genuine fear of Iraq's intentions in Khuzistan. Tariq Aziz said that Iraq's statements on Khuzistan were defensive, in effect tactical. Nevertheless, this illustrated, he said, the point he was making about the Shah's long-term interests. He implied, but did not say, that this was an area in which Iraq could make trouble, once its hands were free from the Kurdish problem.

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

3. I thought it was a prudent moment to raise the subject of Oman. I said that the new Sultan was doing a lot for his country that required to be done and, though there might be some waste, was spending his money well on such things as roads, schools, hospitals, etc. We believed that the Iranian presence was temporary and would be withdrawn as soon as the rebellion in Dhofar was over; and we also believed that it was within the rights of a sovereign country to turn to whoever it liked for help. After all, Iraq itself received support in training from India and the Soviet Union. Tariq Aziz said that training was one thing but to use foreign troops to put down a domestic rebellion was another. Unlike the Kurds in Iraq, the rebels in Dhofar were part and parcel of the people of Oman, in race, tongue and religion. It was not the case that a rebellion of this kind could have been sustained without there being genuine political grievances and a political solution must be found - roads, hospitals and schools were not enough. I commented that I thought that the Sultan was well aware of this and that a considerable effort was being put into it. Nevertheless the problem was not easy and it was not possible to leap to representative government in one bound. Tariq Aziz predictably interjected that representative government of Western conception was not necessarily the answer. I continued that I had discussed the problem with Jamali, the Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had urged the need for an Arab solution to the problem. We would certainly welcome that but the Arab League mission, which had been set up to try to bring it about, had been refused entry to South Yemen. Moreover, it was known that the rebels in Dhofar were supported not only from South Yemen but by others from outside the area, notably the Chinese. Tariq Aziz said that if that was so, then that also was wrong. The conversation then turned to other matters.

No! Soviet Union

Yours ever

J A N Graham

Copied to:

HE Mr A D Parsons CMG MVO MC, Tehran
HE Mr D F Hawley, CMG MBE, Muscat
R C Samuel Esq, Washington

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
LIBRARY No 35
-8 JAN 1975
NBR 3/324/1

18 December 1974

M. Williams 8/1
 M. Burtchard 1/1
 M. Young - per 3
 4/1, 7/1

My dear Michael,

LAST PAPER

IRAQ/IRAN

1. I called on 18 December on the new Minister of Information, Tariq Aziz. I had met him when he gave a lunch for Harold Hurley but this was my first call on him in his office. He had said he wanted to talk about the British press and the Kurdish question and I, for my part, wanted to raise the future of the British School of Archaeology, about which I am writing separately.

2. In the event, the meeting, which was fixed some time ago, followed the shooting down of the two Iraqi aircraft and the conversation largely took the form of a discussion of Iraq's problems with Iran. Tariq Aziz said that the present Iraqi Government had some 40 power expectations to be faced with problems. They were a young and revolutionary regime and problems were meat and drink to them (I paraphrase). In fact they had not met as many as they had expected but those, such as the Kurdish question, with which they were grappling, they would deal with whether it took 2, 3, 4 or 5 years. The Shah's policy in Kurdistan and towards Iraq was very short sighted. If Iraq and Iran could reach an understanding quickly, the Kurdish problem would soon be resolved and Iraq and Iran could settle down as good neighbors. If, however, the Iraqis had to settle the problem by themselves, as they would, the Shah could not expect the Iraq Government to be well disposed towards him thereafter. Moreover Iraq was indisputably an Arab country in which the Kurds formed only some 20%. Iran, on the other hand, was not predominantly Persian, since counting the Kurds, Baluchis and Arabs, the Persians amounted only to some 60% of the population. I asked Tariq Aziz at this point whether the Shah's policy might not be based on a disguised fear of Iraq's Islamic Revolution. He said that was not correct. Nevertheless, this kind of question should be asked about the Shah's policy. He said that the Shah was not a man who would cause trouble, unless it came from Iran.



Record Of Conversation With Iraqi Officials With Regard To Relations With Iran; Violation Of Airspace; Situation Of Kurds. Political Relations Between Iraq And Iran. 18 Dec. 1974. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2315. Newspaper Cutting And Maps. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107499016/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=96068267&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.